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With the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), the U.S. Congress introduced sweeping
substantive and procedural reforms for securities class actions. A
central provision of the Act is the lead plaintiff provision, which
creates a rebuttable presumption that the investor with the largest
financial interest in a securities fraud class action should be
appointed the lead plaintiff for the suit. The lead plaintiff provision
was adopted to encourage a class member with a large financial
stake to become the class representative. Congress expected that
such a plaintiff would actively monitor the conduct of a securities
fraud class action so as to reduce the litigation agency costs that
may arise when class counsel’s interests diverge from those of the
shareholder class.
Now, more than ten years after the enactment of the lead
plaintiff provision, the claim that the lead plaintiff, and particularly
the lead plaintiff that is an institutional investor, is a more effective
monitor of class counsel in securities fraud class actions continues to
be intuitively appealing, but remains unproven. In this study,
Professors Cox and Thomas inquire anecdotally and empirically
whether the lead plaintiff provision has performed as projected. The
anecdotal evidence they uncover is mixed, in some instances
demonstrating the virtues of the lead plaintiff provision, while in
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others showing that the provision has encountered difficulties,
including hesitance among institutional lead plaintiffs to take on the
burden of serving as lead plaintiff (though recently more institutional
investors are taking on the role of lead plaintiff) and allegations of
“pay-to-play” schemes between plaintiffs’ law firms and potential
lead plaintiffs.
Professors Cox and Thomas then conduct a series of statistical
analyses of the lead plaintiff provision’s costs and benefits.
Surprisingly, their results indicate that the ratio of settlement
amounts to estimated provable losses in securities class actions---the
most important indicator of whether investors have been
compensated for their damages---has been lower since the passage
of PSLRA and that settlement size has not increased since the
passage of PSLRA. However, they also find that the presence of an
institutional investor increases the dollar amount of settlements in
those cases in which they appear, suggesting that the current trend
for institutional investors to be lead plaintiffs in securities class
actions will positively affect average settlement size in such actions
in the future. Their analysis also sheds new light on the relative
impacts other types of lead plaintiffs, such as individuals versus an
aggregation of individuals, have on the outcome of settlements. They
conclude with a discussion of the policy implications of their
findings.
INTRODUCTION
With the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (“PSLRA” or “the Act”),1 the U.S. Congress introduced sweeping
substantive and procedural reforms for securities class actions. A central
provision of the Act is the lead plaintiff provision,2 which creates a rebuttable
presumption that the investor with the largest financial interest in a securities
fraud class action should be appointed the lead plaintiff for the suit.3 The lead
plaintiff provision was adopted to encourage a class member with a large

1. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.) (amending Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77z-1 (2000)) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4)).
2. See id. sec. 101(a), § 27(a) (amending 15. U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)); id. sec. 101(b), § 27D(a)
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)).
3. The idea behind the lead plaintiff provision was first proposed in an influential law
review article by Professors Weiss and Beckerman. See Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman,
Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in
Securities Class Actions, 104 Yale L.J. 2053, 2057–58 (1995) (arguing that institutional investor
would more likely serve as “litigation monitor” if made lead plaintiff, but claiming that judicial
practices discouraged such assignment).
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financial stake to become the class representative. Congress expected that
such a plaintiff would actively monitor the conduct of a securities fraud class
action4 so as to reduce the litigation agency costs5 that may arise when class
counsel’s interests diverge from those of the shareholder class.6 The Congress
clearly envisioned that various financial institutions—pension funds, insurance
companies, and mutual funds—were the most likely types of investors who
could combine a large financial stake in the suit’s outcome with the
sophistication to guide the suit to an appropriate result. Proponents of the
provision claimed that there would be substantial benefits from having
institutional investors serve as lead plaintiffs, including more favorable
settlement terms, lower attorneys’ fees for class counsel, fewer strike suits,
more adjudications of class actions,7 greater deterrence of securities fraud, and
the reduction of some potential costs.8 To be sure, the net benefits that would

4. See S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 11 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690
(“[I]ncreasing the role of institutional investors in class actions will ultimately benefit the class
and assist the courts.”).
5. A very different agency cost problem is whether institutional investors that are the
victims of fraudulent reporting systematically fail to present proof of their losses in settled
securities class actions so that their lapse harms their beneficiaries. See James D. Cox & Randall
S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in
Securities Class Actions?, 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 855, 875–77 tbls.2 & 3 (2002) [hereinafter Cox &
Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table] (finding that more than two-thirds of those required to
record their holdings of public companies with SEC failed to submit proof of claims in fifty-three
securities class action settlements); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip
Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial
Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 411, 421–24
tbl.1 (2005) [hereinafter Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions Slip] (finding that, in 108 settled
securities class actions, 72% of large investors fail to present proof of claims).
6. See Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection of
Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring/Summer 2001, at 53, 53
[hereinafter Fisch, Aggregation] (arguing that lead plaintiff can “reduce agency costs and improve
litigation decisions”). For a more general discussion of litigation agency costs in class actions,
see Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation:
Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 133, 148–56 (2004).
7. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 3, at 2121–23.
8. See, e.g., Keith L. Johnson, Deterrence of Corporate Fraud Through Securities Litigation:
The Role of Institutional Investors, Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1997, at 155, 156–57
[hereinafter Johnson, Deterrence] (suggesting that institutions develop more graduated fee
structures to discourage class counsel from bringing “unnecessary” suits; seek damages directly
from officers and directors who had engaged in wrongdoing; and ask for governance changes at
companies where firm’s culture or internal governance structure had contributed to problem).
Private suits are not the only means of assuring deterrence, as violators can also be
prosecuted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and even the Department of
Justice. For a study of the profile of the type of suit that attracts both private and SEC actions as
contrasted with those that only attract the attention of private litigants, see James D. Cox &
Randall S. Thomas, Public and Private Enforcement of the Securities Laws: Have Things
Changed Since Enron?, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 893, 901–02 (2005) (finding that SEC
involvement is more likely to occur, post-2001, in settlements involving larger market
capitalization issuers); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas with Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement
Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 Duke L.J. 737, 764–66 (2004) [hereinafter Cox & Thomas,
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flow from the lead plaintiff provision were impossible to estimate when it was
adopted in 1995; nonetheless, the premise that institutions would make more
effective monitors than individual investors seemed reasonable and was not
seriously contested.
Now, more than ten years after the enactment of the lead plaintiff
provision, the claim that the lead plaintiff, and particularly the lead plaintiff
that is an institutional investor, is a more effective monitor of class counsel in
securities fraud class actions continues to be intuitively appealing, but remains
unproven.9 In this study, we inquire empirically whether the lead plaintiff
provision has performed as projected. More importantly, this study provides
insights into how the type of plaintiff impacts settlements of securities class
actions. We begin on an anecdotal level in Part I, raising examples scattered
throughout the literature and popular press of instances where institutional lead
plaintiffs have achieved large settlements in high profile cases, negotiated
advantageous attorneys’ fee agreements, and apparently acted as good
monitors in reducing litigation agency costs.
However, the evidence bearing on the virtues of the institutional lead
plaintiff is not all positive. Disturbingly, many institutions have been reluctant
to assume the role of lead plaintiff, especially in smaller cases.10 The available
evidence suggests that, as late as 2001, institutions had appeared in only 5 to
10% of all securities fraud class actions, although there are indications that
they are getting involved more frequently in recent years.11 Indeed, in our
study of 388 settlements, pension funds and other financial institutions
represented a very small percentage of the post-PSLRA plaintiffs. As our data

SEC Heuristics] (finding that, for settlements prior to 2002, parallel SEC enforcement action
more likely involved smaller market capitalization issuers experiencing financial distress than
settlements arising from violations that did not involve parallel SEC enforcement action).
9. Compare, e.g., Max W. Berger et al., Institutional Investors as Lead Plaintiffs: Is There a
New and Changing Landscape?, 75 St. John’s L. Rev. 31, 31–32 (2001) (concluding that larger
settlements are due to expanding role of institutions as lead plaintiffs), with John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Litigation Governance: A Gentle Critique of the Third Circuit Task Force Report, 74 Temp. L.
Rev. 805, 807 (2001) [hereinafter Coffee, Litigation Governance] (arguing that it is “reasonable”
but unproven that institutional lead counsel can perform effectively).
10. See, e.g., Martin v. Atchison Casting Corp., 200 F.R.D. 453, 456–57 (D. Kan. 2001)
(bemoaning that court had only two extremely small investors who had petitioned to be lead
plaintiffs and that it had no power to conscript larger institution in class to become lead plaintiff).
11. See PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 2003 Securities Litigation Study 6 (2003), available
at www.10b5.com/2003_study.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“In 2002
institutional investors and public investment or pension funds comprised 51 percent of the lead
plaintiffs for all cases filed. In 2003 these major investors represented 42 percent of the lead
plaintiffs in cases filed.”); Laura E. Simmons & Ellen M. Ryan, Cornerstone Research, PostReform Act Securities Lawsuits: Settlements Reported Through December 2003, at 9 (2004)
(“Approximately 30% of all post-Reform Act settlements have involved institutions serving as
lead plaintiffs.”). If we focus only on public pension fund lead plaintiffs, then these numbers
drop significantly. For example, the PricewaterhouseCoopers study cited above finds that in
2003, based on cases filed through September 30, public pension funds filed only 28% of the
cases in their sample. See PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, supra, at 6.
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reveals, by any metric—for example, the number of settled cases, the dollar
amount of settlements, or the provable losses suffered by the class—a
securities class action suit’s representative is far more likely to be an
aggregation of nonfinancial institutional investors or even a single individual.
Thus we examine here not only whether having a financial institution as a lead
plaintiff impacts the quality of the settlement, but also whether differences
exist between suits having as their representative an aggregation of
nonfinancial institutions and individuals versus a single individual investor as
the class representative.
Moreover, there have been press reports that institutions are aggressively
lobbied by plaintiffs’ law firms to appear as lead plaintiffs. One prominent
business publication went so far as to imply the presence of “pay-to-play”
schemes. This practice, if present, means political contributions are made in
exchange for institutional investors’ agreement to become a lead plaintiff and
to select a preferred law firm as class counsel.12 While such claims are
difficult to verify empirically, we reviewed state-posted electronic information
about lobbyists and found some evidence that plaintiffs’ law firms have hired
lobbyists in several states. We have also learned from pension fund officials
that these lobbyists have attempted to persuade them to act as lead plaintiffs.
And we have personally observed the efforts of several plaintiffs’ firms to host
conferences and other gatherings designed to attract institutions.
After this anecdotal cost-benefit comparison, we turn to our empirical
analysis in Part II. Our data shows that courts consistently favor financial
institutions over other types of investors when there is a contest among them to
be appointed lead plaintiff. As will be seen in Part II.A, in the overwhelming
majority of the Westlaw and Lexis cases in which a court issued an opinion
selecting one lead plaintiff candidate over another, we found that courts
invariably select institutional investors as lead plaintiffs in lieu of other types
of petitioners. We therefore explore whether this preference is borne out by
the evidence, namely whether financial institutions are the most effective
monitors of the class counsel.
In order to do so, in Part II.B we examine the size of actual lead plaintiffs’
claims. For a group of thirty-five class action settlements, we have complete
data on the lead plaintiff’s actual claims which we obtained from proprietary
databases of claims administrators. We break the lead plaintiffs into four
categories:
public pension funds; other institutional investors; single
individual lead plaintiffs; and aggregate groups of lead plaintiffs. We find that
the lead plaintiff public pension funds in our sample have much larger dollar
claims than any of the other types of lead plaintiff.13 The lead plaintiff public
pension funds on average represent a much larger percentage (4%) of the
12. See Neil Weinberg & Daniel Fisher, The Class Action Industrial Complex, Forbes, Sept.
20, 2004, at 150, 152–53.
13. Furthermore, on average, the public pension fund claims are bigger than 99.7% of all the
other claims filed in those cases.
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claims filed in the case, too. By contrast, single individual investors that are
lead plaintiffs have the smallest average total dollar claims and represent on
average the smallest percentage (0.11%) of the claims filed in cases. Overall,
our data suggests that only institutional investor lead plaintiffs have large
enough stakes in these cases to justify their active monitoring of the class
counsel.
In Part II.C, we turn to an analysis of a sample of securities fraud class
action settlements to further investigate the effect of the lead plaintiff
provision. We begin with descriptive statistics for the key variables in our
sample. We find that, first, with the exception of the small set of cases where
institutional investors have acted as lead plaintiffs, there are no significant
differences between the pre-PSLRA and post-PSLRA cases in our sample with
respect to almost every relevant characteristic: settlement amounts, length of
class period, size of defendant firms, and estimated provable losses. In other
words, only institutional investor lead plaintiffs appear to be associated with
any difference in these metrics.
We were, however, shocked to find that the ratio of settlement amounts to
estimated provable losses—which is the most important indicator of whether
investors are being compensated for their damages—was statistically lower in
the post-PSLRA period. After the passage of PSLRA, investors in our sample
appear to be worse off because they are recovering a lower percentage of their
losses. One possible interpretation of this finding is that Congress should
repeal PSLRA in its entirety if it wishes to help defrauded investors.
We next use multivariate regressions to test three different hypotheses.
First, we hypothesize that PSLRA’s lead plaintiff provision has increased the
dollar amount of settlements in securities fraud class actions. Our results show
that after controlling for estimated losses, market capitalization of defendant
firms, the length of class period, and the presence of parallel SEC actions, the
dollar amount of post-PSLRA settlements is not statistically different from that
of the pre-PSLRA cases in our sample. This finding suggests that PSLRA has
not raised overall settlement size.
Second, we analyze the determinants of institutional investors’ decisions
to become lead plaintiffs in the cases in our sample. We hypothesize that
institutions are more likely to become lead plaintiffs in cases involving larger
provable losses, with longer class periods, with larger defendant firms, and
when there is a parallel SEC enforcement action. Our results are consistent
with this hypothesis. In other words, institutional investors are selecting the
biggest cases in which to appear as lead plaintiffs.
Finally, we theorize that institutional lead plaintiffs will be the most
effective in raising settlement size. In our regression, we find that the presence
of an institutional lead plaintiff improves the settlement size, even holding
constant estimated provable losses, firm market capitalization, the length of
class period, and the presence of an SEC enforcement action. This result
suggests that the trend toward using institutional investors as lead plaintiffs
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will have a positive effect on settlement size in securities fraud cases.
Our focus is not isolated to the effects of institutional lead plaintiffs. We
also examine whether settlements are significantly different among various
types of noninstitutional lead plaintiffs: a single individual, an aggregation of
individuals, and a group comprised of individuals and a noninstitutional entity.
We conclude that individual lead plaintiffs perform best in the smallest cases
and worst in the large cases.
In our concluding section, we discuss the policy implications of our
results and the current status of the lead plaintiff provision.
I. THE PROMISE OF THE LEAD PLAINTIFF PROVISION
A. The Value of Lead Plaintiff Monitoring in Reducing Litigation Agency
Costs
At the heart of the lead plaintiff provision is Congress’s belief that the
securities class action needed an “owner” of the suit’s outcome. This belief is
founded on Congress’s appreciation of the weak incentives that abound to act
in the class interest in securities class actions.14
Well before 1995, the problem of incentives for class action suits was
understood. Because class action suits typically were maintained on a
contingency fee basis, the class attorney had a nontrivial investment in the suit
that assumed increasing importance to the attorney as it proceeded.
Maintaining a portfolio of such suits spread the risk of failing to recoup costs
among several possible actions. But the risk remained, and the attorney could
be expected to be a rational economic actor. As such, a settlement offer that
provided recovery of the attorney’s tangible and opportunity costs could loom
larger than the prospect of aggressively pursuing the action to a more lucrative
prospective judgment or settlement.15
The class action lawyer’s weak incentives to pursue aggressively a
meritorious action were not overcome by the self-interest of the members of
the class. Class members suffered profound collective action problems that
prevented close monitoring of the class action attorney. Though class action
procedures required that there be a representative of the class, the requirements
to be such a representative were not very demanding. The class representative
14. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 6 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685
(observing that investors in class suits have “great difficulty exercising any meaningful direction
over the case”).
15. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of
the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 Md. L. Rev. 215, 230 (1983) (arguing that
attorneys generally had more at stake in class actions than their clients); Jill E. Fisch, Class
Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 533, 535 (1997) [hereinafter
Fisch, Reform] (discussing goal of PSLRA to limit suits where settlements did not benefit
individual plaintiffs but were of enormous financial benefit to their attorneys).
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was frequently recruited by plaintiffs’ lawyers in the securities bar, who
maintained “a list of potential plaintiffs and their stockholdings.”16 These
plaintiffs were viewed as often “poorly informed about the theories of their
cases, . . . totally ignorant of the facts, or . . . illiterate concerning financial
matters.”17 In many instances, they had “close relationship[s] to the plaintiff’s
lawyer or her firm.”18 Uninformed, and sometimes conflicted, class
representatives were hardly ideal monitors.19
Furthermore, the presiding judge, overwhelmed by a crowded docket and
poorly armed against the possible self-interest of the attorneys who promoted
the suit’s settlement,20 was not capable of effectively protecting the interests of
the class. And there was the ever present danger that suits were without merit
and brought solely to extort a settlement at a level that was just a tad below the
costs to defend the suit.21
These perceived agency costs prompted Congress to enact the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995.22 The legislation, reflecting the

16. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 3, at 2060–61 (noting that prior to enactment of
PSLRA, “usual pattern” for finding lead plaintiff was for plaintiffs’ lawyer to “take the initiative”
in launching securities fraud action after observing significant move in defendant company’s
stock price).
17. Id. at 2060.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 2064–65 (“No one disputes that a named plaintiff who has only a nominal
financial interest in a class action, especially a plaintiff that an attorney has ‘recruited,’ is unlikely
to monitor effectively her attorney’s prosecution of the action or the terms [of the settlement].”);
Fisch, Aggregation, supra note 6, at 56 (“The stakes of class members are generally too small to
warrant active monitoring. Instead, class actions are effectively run by class counsel. Plaintiffs’
lawyers bear most of the risk of the lawsuit and exercise virtually complete control over litigation
decisions.”); Johnson, Deterrence, supra note 8, at 156 (“Clients have been notoriously absent in
class action litigation.”).
20. See, e.g., Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting) (“Once a settlement is agreed, the attorneys for the plaintiff stockholders link arms
with their former adversaries to defend [their] joint handiwork . . . .”). A more cynical view of
the judge’s role in reviewing settlements appears in In re Warner Communications Securities
Litigation, 618 F. Supp. 735, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“[T]he court starts from the familiar axiom
that a bad settlement is almost always better than a good trial.”). See generally James D. Cox,
Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 497, 523–24 (1997) (arguing
that PSLRA may have focused on wrong issues because courts have always had power to select
more meritorious plaintiff as class representative and to impose sanctions for baseless suits).
21. A related problem is that class counsel would agree to a lowball settlement of a
meritorious claim in exchange for a large fee. See Fisch, Aggregation, supra note 6, at 57 (noting
this problem to be “[t]he most commonly cited example of the potential conflict between lawyer
and client interests”); Johnson, Deterrence, supra note 8, at 156 (“Lack of effective client
oversight has led to concern that class counsel might prosecute class actions in a way that
produces the greatest legal fees rather than the result that would be most beneficial to class
members.”).
22. See Lisa L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench: Judging
Fiduciaries and Fiduciary Judging, 2003 BYU L. Rev. 1239, 1286 (“Both the statutory language
and the legislative history of the PSLRA make manifest Congress’s concern that securities class
counsel, if left unmonitored, will behave in ways that harm both absent class members and the
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interests of the narrow group of high-tech executives and accounting firms who
were its strongest backers, focused only on the conduct of private securities
litigation.23 The PSLRA establishes a process to select a class representative.
Under the supervision of the court, notice is published to class members
seeking one or more to become the representative. Any shareholder that is a
member of the class can respond by filing a motion to be appointed lead
plaintiff. The court, within ninety days of the notice’s publication, is required
to select a lead plaintiff.24
In making this decision, the court is guided by the PSLRA’s provision
that there is a rebuttable presumption that the member of the class with the
largest financial stake in the relief sought is the “most adequate plaintiff.”25

private enforcement system generally.”); Thompson & Thomas, supra note 6, at 136–37 (noting
that such “litigation agency costs” prompted Congress to pass PSLRA).
23. Antitrust, product liability, and other types of suits that are commonly maintained as
class actions, and for which the same weak incentives abound, were unaffected by this legislation.
The PSLRA altered many features of class action securities litigation. Foremost of these in the
minds of class action lawyers is the heightened pleading requirement. Abandoning seven decades
of notice pleading, the Act requires that securities fraud claims must be made with such
particularity as to raise a “strong inference” of a violation. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000).
This stronger pleading requirement is coupled with the Act’s bar of any discovery until the
disposition of motions to dismiss, including a motion to dismiss for failure to plead with the
requisite particularity. See id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). The class action attorney is therefore caught in
the procedural jaws of a strong vice that first demands that the complaint set forth facts
establishing a strong inference that the defendants knowingly or recklessly misrepresented a
material fact, while simultaneously depriving the attorney of discovery procedures whereby facts
could be gathered to support the allegation. Although estimates vary, one source claims that,
after passage of the PSLRA, approximately one-quarter of the motions to dismiss in securities
class actions are granted. See Lisa Klein Wager & Adrienne M. Ward, Securities Class Actions:
A Company’s Bad News Gets Worse, Bus. L. Today, July–Aug. 2002, at 15, 18. A more recent
study found that 40.3% of securities class actions filed between 1998 and 2003 were dismissed.
See Ronald I. Miller et al., NERA Econ. Consulting, Recent Trends in Shareholder Class Action
Litigation: Beyond the Mega-Settlements, Is Stabilization Ahead? 4 (2006). Before the PSLRA,
20.3% of the suits filed in 1991–1995 were dismissed within five years of their filing. See Elaine
Buckberg et al., NERA Econ. Consulting, Recent Trends in Shareholder Class Action Litigation:
Are WorldCom and Enron the New Standard? 3 (2005) [hereinafter Buckberg et al., WorldCom
and Enron].
24. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3).
25. Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii). For the rare instance when the largest loss does not qualify one
to be a class’s lead plaintiff, see Tice v. Novastar Fin., Inc., No. 04-0330, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16800, at *24 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 23, 2004) (believing market maker would be subject to unique
defenses even though having largest loss among those petitioning to be lead plaintiff and
therefore selecting plaintiff with second largest loss along with two individual investors); In re
Terayon Commc’ns Sys., Inc., Sec. Litig., No. C 00-01967, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3131, at *21–
*22 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2004) (removing as lead plaintiff entities with large losses incurred in
connection with defendant corporation’s apparent scheme to depress its common shares using
massive short sales).
Because the lead plaintiff provision makes rebuttable the presumption that the petitioner with
the largest loss is the most adequate plaintiff, Congress obviously recognized that other
considerations may more aptly qualify one to be a lead plaintiff despite that petitioner’s smaller
loss. To be sure, it may be easiest to see the presumption being overcome by extreme facts, such
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The Act does not prescribe all the roles that the lead plaintiff can fulfill, but it
does include selection of class counsel among the lead plaintiff’s roles.26 In
doing so, Congress sought to reverse the pre-PSLRA practice of counsel
choosing the plaintiff rather than the plaintiff choosing counsel.27
The theory behind this structure was that institutions with the largest
losses would have the most to gain from becoming better monitors of the
conduct of the litigation. Institutional investors would reject quick settlements
of meritorious cases because these settlements would not compensate them for
their losses.28 Proponents optimistically projected that activist institutions
as that the petitioner was a market maker. See, e.g., Tice, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16800, at *24
(suggesting that market maker is subject to unique defenses and is therefore not most adequate
plaintiff in spite of having largest losses among those petitioning). However, the PSLRA places
explicit limits on a competing petitioner’s ability to discover the existence of unique defenses that
would impair the petitioner with the largest loss from being an effective representative of the
class. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II)–(B)(iv); Steiner v. Aurora Foods, Inc., No. 00602, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20341, at *15 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2000) (holding that individual
plaintiff who merely alleged possibility that lead plaintiff would have unique defenses failed to
overcome presumption). For a case permitting discovery once the court was satisfied of the
possibility of unique defenses, see Crawford v. Onyx Software Corp., [2001–2002 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 91,682 (W.D. Wa. Jan. 10, 2002) (permitting discovery
against petitioner because its assertion of claims under both 1933 and 1934 Acts may be subject
to unique defenses that render their representation of 1934 Act claims inadequate). Moreover, the
court may well prefer a single institution to a loose aggregation of individuals who collectively
have a much larger loss. For example, in Switzenbaum v. Orbital Sciences Corp., 187 F.R.D.
246, 251 (E.D. Va. 1999), a group of retirement funds was preferred by the court over several
individuals who collectively had a larger loss, in part because the group of funds, unlike the
individuals, had an established procedure for acting collectively.
There is reason to question whether the lead plaintiff provision has even broader
consequences. Some courts believe that the lead plaintiff provision raises the bar that one must
clear to be deemed an adequate representative. Thus, the Fifth Circuit recently recognized in
Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp., 257 F.3d 475, 480–81 (5th Cir. 2001), that the presiding
court has an obligation to satisfy itself that the lead plaintiff is capable of directing the litigation.
The Fifth Circuit held that the court must assure itself that the lead plaintiff “possess[es] a
sufficient level of knowledge and understanding to be capable of ‘controlling’ or ‘prosecuting’
the litigation.” Id. at 482–83. The court, therefore, understood the PSLRA’s lead plaintiff
provision to raise the standard above the adequacy threshold that applies to class actions in other
contexts. See id. at 483. To this end, the court held it would consider the fee agreement the
petitioner had negotiated with the proposed lead counsel. It would thereby determine whether the
plaintiff was not just the petitioner with the largest loss, but the most adequate among those
petitioning to be named lead plaintiff. Berger appears to represent a distinctly minority position,
as other courts do not seek to confirm a petitioner’s larger loss qualifying it to be a lead plaintiff
by examining the negotiations the petitioner has had with proposed counsel. See, e.g., In re
Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726, 734, 739 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing district court’s selection of
petitioner whose loss of $59,000 was much smaller than that of other petitioners but who had
negotiated fee one-half the rate of counsel to represent five petitioning businessmen whose total
losses were $3.3 million).
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(v); id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v).
27. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 730 (stating impetus for legislation was “manipulation by class action lawyers of the clients
whom they purportedly represent”).
28. See Fisch, Reform, supra note 15, at 538–39 (“[L]arge investor[s] ha[ve] a financial
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would garner “disproportionately large benefits” from their involvement as
lead plaintiffs because they would increase the return on their funds’ larger
investments.29 These gains would bolster the funds’ comparative performance
vis-à-vis other institutions and result in further benefits for the activists.
Furthermore, since institutional investors who manage other people’s money
have fiduciary obligations to take “reasonable steps to realize on claims that
will advance the interests of beneficiaries,”30 proponents of the PSLRA
structure were optimistic that institutional investors would become involved in
these cases.
While the lead plaintiff provision was principally designed to improve
shareholder monitoring of class counsel, its proponents also hoped that it
would introduce market forces into class action litigation and change the ways
in which plaintiffs’ securities law firms did business. For example, plaintiffs’
lawyers would “no longer find it necessary to race to the courthouse” but could
instead more carefully investigate the merits of potential claims before
deciding whether to file complaints.31 Furthermore, institutional investors
might be solicited by plaintiffs’ law firms to become lead plaintiffs, but, as
more experienced and sophisticated clients, such institutions would be better
able to select competent class counsel.
In the next two subsections, we examine the benefits and costs of the lead
plaintiff provision. Our analysis is based on interviews with institutional
investors, survey data, reported cases, and earlier research by other scholars.
Our survey data is taken from a confidential survey of institutional investors
that had served, or had considered serving, as lead plaintiffs in securities fraud
class actions.32
B. Beneficial Effects of the Lead Plaintiff Provision
There are many levels at which the lead plaintiff can enhance the welfare

incentive to prevent plaintiffs’ counsel from selling out legitimate claims too easily . . . .”).
29. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 3, at 2111.
30. Johnson, Deterrence, supra note 8, at 157. But see Cox & Thomas, Leaving Money on
the Table, supra note 5, at 877 (finding that between two-thirds and three-quarters of institutional
investors failed to file claims in securities fraud class action settlements to recover their share of
settlement fund).
31. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 3, at 2106; see also Elliott J. Weiss, Comment, The
Impact to Date of the Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 39
Ariz. L. Rev. 561, 561–62 (1997) (“[Prior to PSLRA,] a relatively small number of plaintiffs’
attorneys regularly were filing class actions only hours or days after the disclosure of information
that precipitated a major move in the price of a corporation’s stock.”).
32. We distributed the survey to a large number of institutional investors in conjunction with
another survey of claims filing practices. We received seven completed surveys back. Given the
complexity of the survey and the sensitivity of the information being requested, it is not
surprising that our response rate was so low. Because of the low response rate, we offer the
results of the survey as anecdotal evidence only and make no attempt to use it to draw statistical
inferences. We thank those institutions that were willing to share this information with us.
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of all members of the class. Areas that have attracted attention by the courts
and commentators include the selection of the lead class attorney as well as the
shaping of the attorneys’ fee structure.33 Before 1995, courts usually selected
the attorneys that were first to file a securities fraud complaint as the lead
counsel for the class.34 This judicial practice led to a “race to the courthouse,”
as the lead counsel position can be quite lucrative for the firm that is chosen.35
After the passage of PSLRA, things changed in cases where institutional
investors became involved as lead plaintiffs. In some instances, efforts of lead
plaintiffs have visibly yielded results to the class’s benefit. For example, in
Moore v. Halliburton, the court refused to approve a settlement when one of
the class’s lead plaintiffs protested that the settlement accomplished too
little.36 Moore involved a class counsel that did not consult with the protesting
lead plaintiff and proceeded to reach a settlement that was smaller than the
sanction the SEC had imposed on the defendant for the same misbehavior
alleged in the class action.37
The strongest embrace the lead plaintiff provision has received from the
courts is In re Cendant Corp. Litigation.38 The Third Circuit held that, with
rare exceptions, the court should defer to the lead plaintiff’s decision about
who should be the class attorney as well as what the fee arrangement should be
for the class counsel.39 The Cendant court also reversed the decision of the

33. See, e.g., Fisch, Aggregation, supra note 6, at 92–93 (describing how institutional
investors are negotiators of “sophisticated compensation agreements that reduce legal fees and
minimize agency costs”).
34. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 3, at 2062. In jurisdictions where the courts
preferred to allow the filing attorneys to determine which among them would be appointed as lead
counsel, early filing was still important. In this situation, the first filing attorneys would
frequently “share copies of their complaints with other plaintiffs’ lawyers who [would] support
their election as lead counsel.” Id. at 2063.
35. See id. at 2062 (“The lead counsel effectively controls the conduct of a class action,
including assignment of work among all lawyers who represent putative class action plaintiffs. If
the lead counsel chooses to do much of the work herself, she will be able to claim the lion’s share
of any fees awarded.”); see also Fisch, Aggregation, supra note 6, at 56–57 (noting that prePSLRA practice of selecting counsel based on first to file rule encouraged, among other abuses,
counsel to “seek out prospective plaintiffs”).
36. No. 3:02-CV-1152-M, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18187, at *15–*21 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9,
2004). This is not to say that the opposition of a lead plaintiff dooms the settlement. See Kloster
v. McColl (In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig.), 350 F.3d 747, 752 (8th Cir. 2003) (approving
settlement over objections of three members of one lead plaintiff group in class action involving
four plaintiff classes).
37. See Moore, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18187, at *13–*20 (discussing SEC’s imposition of
$7.5 million penalty when proposed class action settlement was $6 million).
38. 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001). Subsequently, the Third Circuit also held that there is a
rebuttable presumption of the correctness of the lead plaintiff’s decision not to compensate three
law firms that represented some class members and that provided various professional services
they argued benefited the class. See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173, 197–98 (3d
Cir. 2005) (viewing primary responsibility for deciding attorneys’ compensation as shifting from
court to lead plaintiff after appointment of lead plaintiff).
39. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d at 276 (holding that courts should defer to lead
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trial court that substituted an auction among competing law firms to select the
class’s attorney for the agreed-upon fee.40 Cendant is a dramatic illustration of
how institutional investor involvement can impact positively the selection and
compensation of the class’s lead counsel. The fee structure negotiated by the
lead plaintiff was approximately $76 million less than the lowest bid submitted
via the auction carried out by the trial court.41 The result in Cendant reflects
the broader experience of institutional investors: They are often able to lower
counsel fees to one-half to one-third of the historical average of 32% of the
recovery.42
To the extent a lead plaintiff can substitute bargaining between the lead
plaintiff and the class counsel for the auction process, this may more accurately
account for additional, societally relevant factors. If fees are but one of many
factors in evaluating the value of class counsel, the auction process as
conducted by courts probably poorly internalizes the other factors into the
process. For example, the auction process is ill suited for sharp judgments on
less quantifiable factors such as the quality of the representation, the likely
timeliness of the suit’s disposition, and the responsiveness of the lead plaintiff
to the interests of the class members.43 We suspect that lead plaintiff-class
plaintiff’s choice of counsel and fee agreement when choice is “reasonable on [its] own terms”);
see also In re Razorfish, Inc. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (reasoning
that auction approach is inconsistent with PSLRA’s emphasis on close client supervision of
counsel). For an illustration of how the court’s displeasure with the lead plaintiff’s inability to
retain counsel on terms favorable to the class can lead to intervention by the supervising court,
see In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475, 482, 487–89 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
40. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d at 279 (reversing use of auction for abuse of
discretion).
41. Id. at 272 n.50.
42. See Keith L. Johnson, Selecting Lead Counsel in the Midst of Judicial Chaos,
Institutional Investor Advoc. (Bernstein Litowitz Berge & Grossman, New York, N.Y.), Third
Quarter 2001, at 1, 2, available at http://www.blbglaw.com/advocate/adv2001Q3.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Johnson, Selecting Lead Counsel] (estimating that State
of Wisconsin Investment Board (SWIB) alone might have saved $6 million in legal fees over
previous five years if other lead plaintiffs had employed “competitive fee setting practices”); see
also Richard B. Schmitt, Pension Fund Plays Crucial Role in Suit, Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1998, at
B19 (reporting that SWIB acting as lead plaintiff had negotiated lead counsel fees of 18% of total
settlement compared with national average of 32%); Michael A. Perino, Markets and Monitors:
The Impact of Competition and Experience on Attorneys’ Fees in Securities Class Actions 2 (St.
John’s Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research, Working Paper No. 06-0034, 2006), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=870577 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding “significant
negative correlation between public pension fund participation as a lead plaintiff and both fee
requests and fee awards”).
43. See Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class
Counsel by Auction, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 650, 710–16 (2002) (arguing that institutional investor
empowerment more effectively incorporates market forces into selection of counsel than auctions
do); Third Circuit Task Force Report on Selection of Class Counsel, 74 Temp. L. Rev. 689, 704–
05 (2001) (concluding that auctions are inconsistent with goals of PSLRA and that traditional
methods of selecting class counsel are preferable); Kendra S. Langlois, Note, Putting the Plaintiff
Class’ Needs in the Lead: Reforming Class Action Litigation by Extending the Lead Plaintiff
Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 855, 904
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counsel negotiations therefore make possible a more nuanced perspective
toward establishing the incentive structure for the class counsel.44
Certainly the PSLRA empowers the lead plaintiff to “select and retain”
counsel with the approval of the court,45 which envisions the possibility that
the lead plaintiff may substitute counsel so as to bring an early conclusion to
the case.46 This could occur when the lead plaintiff believes that the expected
class recovery is dwarfed by the burdens imposed on the corporation and other
defendants.47 Some institutional investors have expressed their frustration
with settlements wrested largely from the defendant company in whom the
institutions have a continuing ownership stake large enough that the settlement
in part is borne by the institution itself:
We [financial institutions] own these companies. . . . We are the market,
or at least a recognizable fraction of it. So I’m not sure it makes much
sense to sue ourselves, give the plaintiff’s bar a cut of our money and then

(2002) (explaining that lowest bidder may be too risk averse because of low fee caps to pursue
aggressively large settlement). But see James L. Tuxbury, Note, A Case for Competitive Bidding
for Lead Counsel in Securities Class Actions, 2003 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 285, 290 (stating that
class recovers higher percentage of settlement when attorneys’ fees are established by
competitive bidding).
44. It would be interesting to compare the performance of counsel selected by auctions with
that of counsel selected under the lead plaintiff provision to see which produces a better recovery
for shareholders. Assuming that the data could be collected, the ratio of settlement amounts to
estimated provable losses might be an appropriate yardstick.
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v) (2000).
46. The heightened pleading standards also partially address the problem of cost-ineffective
suits. Heightened pleading standards probably work best to bar suits that are not well grounded in
the facts, such as the infamous “strike suits” that were the focus of so much of the testimony in
the hearings leading up to the PSLRA’s enactment. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 4, 9–11
(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685 (recounting how settlements depend less on
suits’ merits than on defense costs and that plaintiff with true economic stake in suit would
improve this calculus). However, even the presence of a “strong inference” of scienter on the part
of the company officers does not assure that the amount recoverable for the misrepresentation so
committed will be economically significant. Those responsible, including the corporate
defendant, may have too few assets or insufficient insurance to provide any expectation of a
material recovery. Also, even the purposeful lie may not have impacted the security’s price to
such a degree as to yield provable damages, or at least at the level to justify the suit’s
continuance. After all, any corporate burdens arising from the suit’s continuance and settlement
may well be transmitted to class members who continue to hold shares in the corporate defendant.
See Gluck v. Cellstar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542, 548 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (rejecting challenge to
proposed lead plaintiff on grounds that Congress was aware of possibility that such plaintiff
would continue to hold substantial interest in defendant and could be sensitive to defendant
company’s welfare). Such considerations existed prior to the PSLRA, and it was believed they
would become even more frequent after the PSLRA institutionalized the formal appointment of a
lead plaintiff who was likely to have a continuing significant ownership interest in the defendant.
See Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, The Pentium Papers: A Case Study of Collective
Institutional Investor Activism in Litigation, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 559, 595–96 (1996) (reviewing role
of institutions in pursuing relatively quick dismissal of suit against large technology company).
47. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 3, at 2122–23 (suggesting that institutions might be
able to discourage their counsel from pursuing suits with modest recoveries and high costs).
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pocket (to be reinvested) the rest. To the extent that there are third parties
to cover the losses, we probably own them as well—including the
insurance companies, the underwriters and the auditors. Citigroup is a
good example. They settled their underwriter liability in WorldCom on
[May 10] and their stock took a 2% hit as a result, which cost my funds
about $6 [million]. It’s probably a temporary impact, but it illustrates the
point.48
On the other hand, the lead plaintiff—certainly one whose substantial
trading loss has qualified it to be the lead plaintiff—can easily be seen as an
important restraint on the class attorney settling the suit for too small an
amount. After all, the very purpose of the lead plaintiff provision is to harness
effectively its self-interest to the class action by providing a mechanism for the
class representative to be one who stands to recover a large amount through the
aggressive prosecution of the suit. Such a heavy hitter is more likely to
overcome the personal interests of class counsel who may prefer the certainty
of settling the suit quickly for a smaller amount to investing more of the law
firm’s resources in pursuing a larger settlement that does not yield a
proportional increase in counsel fees.49
As institutional investors have become accustomed to the lead plaintiff
provisions, some broader benefits have been realized. Several of our survey
respondents identified possible changes in corporate governance as an
important potential benefit of becoming involved. These institutions wanted to
“change the system” and therefore were willing to expend the extra time and
effort to become involved. Institutional investor involvement may also be
positively affecting the outcome of settlement negotiations,50 a topic to which
we will return below.
All of these benefits add up. One leading institutional investor told us
that acting as lead plaintiff at a minimum doubles, and often triples or
quadruples, the amount that the institution would have expected to receive if it
had not become involved.51 It also expects to reduce legal fees by one-half to
48. E-mail from confidential institutional investor to authors (May 18, 2004) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
49. The classic illustration of institutional investors inserting themselves to cause the
rejection of a weak settlement otherwise championed by the class counsel is In re California
Micro Devices Securities Litigation, 168 F.R.D. 257, 275–76 (N.D. Cal. 1996), class certified and
settlement approved, 965 F. Supp. 1327 (N.D. Cal. 1997), where intervening lead plaintiffs
secured a settlement with more cash to class members and a contribution from culpable corporate
directors.
50. See Fisch, Aggregation, supra note 6, at 62 (discussing increasing sophistication of
institutional investors in shareholder actions).
51. See e-mail from Keith Johnson, Chief Legal Counsel, State of Wis. Inv. Bd., to authors
(Mar. 10, 2003) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Johnson Correspondence]
(stating that pension funds vastly increase their recovery by taking active lead plaintiff role); see
also Schmitt, supra note 42 (noting that SWIB recovered more than 40% of its estimated damages
in CellStar litigation where it acted as lead plaintiff as compared to average recovery in securities
class actions of 14% of total damages).
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one-third of those normally paid in federal securities class actions.52 Finally,
we note that being repeat players seems to sharpen the skills of institutional
lead plaintiffs, as they have developed litigation guidelines to apply in
determining when to participate as lead plaintiffs, they have prequalified
certain law firms as potential class counsel, and they have become more
sophisticated in negotiating fee agreements.53
Thus, multiple a priori beliefs that prompted Congress to enact the lead
plaintiff provision find anecdotal support in the post-PSLRA case law. Having
an independent, engaged plaintiff is socially useful. Despite these benefits,
few financial institutions seek to so involve themselves, presumably because
they do not see that the rewards of doing so are sufficient to offset the cost of
becoming involved. The next section examines the expected cost of being a
lead plaintiff.
C. The Burdens of Being a Lead Plaintiff
Despite this impressive list of benefits, institutional investors have been
slow to answer the call to become lead plaintiffs. This reluctance may be
explained by the costs of doing so. The SEC’s study of the first year’s
experience under the PSLRA found that institutional investors identified a
number of concerns about the costs and potential liability that they would face
if they became lead plaintiffs.54 In particular, they identified the threat of
discovery into the institutional investor’s business, the amount of time that
they would need to spend to manage the case,55 the potential for disclosure of
proprietary nonpublic information, and the threat of suit by other disgruntled
plaintiffs.56 Others have noted that activist institutions also need to worry

52. See Johnson Correspondence, supra note 51; see also Johnson, Selecting Lead Counsel,
supra note 42, at 2 (discussing role of plaintiff institutional investors in minimizing legal fees);
Schmitt, supra note 42 (noting ability of SWIB to decrease legal fees in securities class action to
18% of settlement instead of national average of 32% of settlement).
53. Most of the survey respondents reported having adopted securities litigation policies that
they applied in making their decision about whether to seek lead plaintiff status. Several also
reported that they had prequalified a number of potential law firms to act as lead counsel before
deciding to apply for a lead plaintiff position. See Fisch, Aggregation, supra note 6, at 62
(“Institutions are developing guidelines to determine when their participation in shareholder
litigation is desirable. Institutions are developing ongoing relationships with plaintiffs’ firms and
increasing sophistication in evaluating and negotiating fee arrangements.” (footnotes omitted)).
54. Office of the Gen. Counsel, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Report to the President and
Congress on the First Year of Practice Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, at 48–49 (1997), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/lreform.txt (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Office of the Gen. Counsel, Report to the President and
Congress].
55. Institutions will need to bear the costs of investigating whether such claims are
meritorious, reading the complaint, selecting the lead counsel, and actively overseeing the
litigation and settlement of any cases. See Fisch, Reform, supra note 15, at 542.
56. See Office of the Gen. Counsel, Report to the President and Congress, supra note 54, at
48–49.
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about the effects of potential access to inside information on their trading
activity or their loss of preferential access to information from defendant
companies, as well as possible political pressure.57 Our conversations with
attorneys active in securities litigation suggest that the potential hardships of
being a lead plaintiff are an important factor that institutional investors are still
considering before acting as lead plaintiffs,58 although the benefits of doing so
may have become increasingly apparent to them.59 We discuss some of these
costs below.60
1. Discovery Into the Lead Plaintiff’s Business Practices. — The
possibility that defendants—and other plaintiffs’ law firms competing to obtain
the lead plaintiff position—might seek to engage in disruptive discovery about
institutional investors’ internal business practices and trading activities was
well understood prior to the passage of PSLRA.61 It was foreseen that
defendants would try to use discovery, or at least the threat of discovery, to
discourage institutions from volunteering to become lead plaintiffs.62 Among
the discovery issues that were projected as potential obstacles were the cost of
producing information about the institution’s trading over the years, its
investment philosophy, and other proprietary information.63 However, the
early advocates of the lead plaintiff provision argued that such costs could be
offset by judicial approval for reasonable expenses, perhaps augmented by

57. See id.
58. Other factors that we were told are considered include the relative merits of the case, the
size of the loss, and the willingness of other institutional investors to take the lead plaintiff
position. Because settlements are distributed in proportion to each class member’s loss, and lead
plaintiffs are not guaranteed they will be reimbursed for the expenses incurred in connection with
being a lead plaintiff, these are significant reasons to not become a lead plaintiff. See Johnson
Correspondence, supra note 51. Thus, the lead plaintiff provision poses significant free rider
issues, a point examined below. See infra notes 77–82 and accompanying text.
59. Our survey respondents were very sensitive to the balance of costs and benefits of acting
as lead plaintiffs. For example, many of them required a multimillion dollar potential loss before
they would even consider the possibility of becoming a lead plaintiff.
60. In a related vein, institutions may take passive roles about becoming lead plaintiffs,
much as they do with filing claims in settled class actions, because their recoveries, while
positive, are not seen as significant enough in comparison to the overall amounts of money that
they are managing. See Cox & Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table, supra note 5, at 879–80
(hypothesizing that small recoveries, even with large losses, would deter institutions from filing
suit).
61. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 3, at 2101–03 (examining how institutions may fear
“boxcar discovery” motions after filing suit).
62. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 270 n.49 (3d Cir. 2001) (observing that
courts must be cautious in granting discovery against lead plaintiff so as to avoid harassment of
lead plaintiff through discovery process); Fisch, Reform, supra note 15, at 545–46 (noting that
defendants will seek discovery to challenge typicality of institutional investor as class
representative or to investigate institution’s trading behavior which might bear on “the manner in
which the class is defined and the institution’s reliance”).
63. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 3, at 2103 (recognizing that lead plaintiffs could
face “[t]he cost of producing all documents concerning an institution’s investment philosophy and
trading over several years [and other] disclosure of proprietary information”).
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incentive awards to the lead plaintiff.64
More directly, the Act conditions the ability of other potential class
representatives to conduct discovery to challenge whether a petitioner should
be appointed lead plaintiff to first demonstrating “a reasonable basis for a
finding that the presumptively most adequate plaintiff is incapable of
adequately representing the class.”65 Although the PSLRA does not expressly
limit the defendants’ ability to engage in discovery about the typicality or
adequacy of an institution to act as a lead plaintiff, courts have found in the
quoted provision congressional intent that defendants cannot engage in
discovery for purposes of challenging the adequacy of the plaintiff to represent
the class.66 Instead, defendants can engage in discovery that is focused on
substantive issues relevant to the case.67
Our discussions with attorneys in this area lead us to believe that
discovery issues, while initially of some concern to institutions, have not
proved to be too onerous.68 Defendants’ counsel have quickly learned that the
investment advisors who advise institutional investors regarding securities
transactions are extremely knowledgeable about the company’s securities
filings and its financial statements. In this sense, the lead plaintiff may well
have more of the characteristics of a reasonable investor than do many of the
class members.
As defendants contemplate their lack of success in
demonstrating that the plaintiffs were not acting in reliance on the company’s
statements or did not understand the meaning of its disclosures, their interest in
pursuing discovery about the institutional investors’ actions has declined.
2. Greater Recoveries for Institutions That Pursue Their Own Actions. —
Institutional investors with large potential claims have sometimes found it
more advantageous to act for themselves rather than on behalf of all other
investors.69 Institutional investors with such claims may believe that their
claims are better pursued as individual claims than as part of a class action.70

64. See id. at 2124 (“[C]ourts grant expenses and incentive awards to plaintiffs in some
class actions [and there should be] no reason why they would not do the same for institutional
plaintiffs.”).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iv) (2000).
66. See, e.g., Fields v. Biomatrix, Inc., 198 F.R.D. 451, 455 (D.N.J. 2000) (denying
discovery focused on adequacy of petitioner to represent class).
67. See, e.g., In re Grand Casinos, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 615, 620–21 (D. Minn. 1998)
(permitting discovery against lead plaintiff for purpose of inquiring in fraud on market case
whether plaintiff in fact relied upon integrity of market when trading).
68. Only one of our survey respondents identified the costs of discovery as a problem. In
that instance, the respondent reported that it had spent over forty hours of attorney time
complying with discovery requests from the defendant in the case where it was acting as a lead
plaintiff. Confidential communications with authors (Mar. 2003) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review). We have also had discussions with attorneys that are active in the field about this issue
and were told that their clients do not believe the discovery issues to be major ones.
69. Four of our survey respondents reported at least one instance where they had opted out
of a securities class action to pursue their own individual recovery.
70. See Langlois, supra note 43, at 876 (“[Institutional] investors feel that they can present a
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They may believe that, in a class action, their stronger claims will be combined
with weaker claims to dilute their ultimate share of the settlement value.71
Some evidence that has been gathered supports this point.72 Moreover,
institutions, with their cadres of analysts, may be in a better position than other
investors to sue under section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,73
where they can likely meet its double reliance standard and thereby escape the
necessity of pleading scienter.74
On the other hand, institutions that opt out of a class action to pursue their
own individual action do face risks. Mainly, such institutions are no longer
able to control the class action litigation. But this should not be a major
deterrent. To be sure, an inadequate record and a poor settlement in a parallel
class is likely to affect adversely the institution’s individual action. However,
many of the public pension funds that have been most active in this area want
to try to fix the system. They desire not only to improve the effectiveness of
class action litigation, but also to strengthen the financial reporting process
through corporate governance changes and to encourage recoveries from
individual corporate officers and directors so that institutional plaintiffs do not
bear indirectly some of the cost of the suit’s successful prosecution.75 These
institutions may be limited in the number of cases in which they can get
involved and would prefer to deploy their resources in class actions where they
can have a broader impact.76
3. Disincentives to Becoming a Lead Plaintiff. — Institutional lead
plaintiffs incur costs when monitoring the actions of lead counsel. These costs
include investigating the claims made, selecting lead counsel, reading any
complaint or pleadings filed by counsel, and expending time and resources to

stronger individual claim than class members can establish as a class action.”).
71. See Grundfest & Perino, supra note 46, at 571–72 (describing strategic benefits of class
actions for weaker claimants and disadvantages for stronger claimants).
72. See Langlois, supra note 43, at 876 (citing Implementation of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong.
21 (1997) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Securities & Exchange Commission)).
73. See 15 U.S.C. § 78r (2000). Section 18 causes of action lie only for material
misrepresentations appearing in documents required to be filed with the SEC and are not
available for misrepresentations appearing only in other media, such as press releases.
74. See generally James D. Cox et al., Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials 553–54
(5th ed. 2006) (reviewing elements of section 18).
75. On the desirability of encouraging recovery from individual wrongdoers so as to avoid
the circularity problem that arises when a corporation contributes significantly to a settlement that
is awarded in part to its existing owners, see generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the
Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 Colum. L. Rev. __
(2006).
76. For some institutions, such as public pension funds, the size of their staff may be limited
by political considerations so that adding extra workers may not be possible even if it makes
financial sense. At other institutions, staff time may be limited because they are reluctant to
increase staffing if they cannot increase their management fees to cover the additional expenses.
Given that existing staff have other duties to perform, this caps the amount of staff time that can
be devoted to litigation.
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monitor the prosecution and possible settlement of the action.77 Related to
such costs are potential “free rider problems, because institutions, particularly
those concerned about minimizing administrative costs generally, are rationally
apt to prefer that another investor take the initiative to become involved.”78 In
fact, one attorney who represents institutional investors in securities fraud class
actions told us that the first question his clients ask before considering
undertaking a lead plaintiff position is whether any other institution is willing
to do it.79
Free rider problems have been a barrier to institutional investor activism
in almost every area of corporate governance.80 The fact remains that, in the
United States, even the largest institutional investors rarely own more than 5%
of a company’s stock, making it imperative that they act as part of a group of
investors if they wish to have a significant impact. In all these situations, the
costs of initiating and sponsoring action are borne by the activists, while any
benefits fall proportionately among all members of the group. Lead plaintiff
proponents claim that free rider problems should not pose the same problems
for institutions choosing to pursue that position because an institution does not
need any other institution’s support to do so.81 In fact, the passivity of other
institutions enhances the chances of the selection of activist funds as lead
plaintiff, assuming such an institution chooses to act.
However, institutional investors’ initial unwillingness to participate as
lead counsel could well have been attributable to free rider problems. Acting
as an effective lead plaintiff can be a very time-consuming task in complex,
aggressively litigated cases, where multiple suits against different sets of
defendants at different points in time may be necessary in order to maximize
the class recovery. Of course, some cases are much more straightforward and
require less oversight, and some institutions will devote less time than is
needed to achieve the most appropriate client-driven litigation goals. But, in
general, an institutional investor lead plaintiff will probably need to devote
significant amounts of out-of-pocket expenses, legal staff time, and investment
staff time. While out-of-pocket expenses are reimbursed in successful actions,
the courts have only sometimes agreed to compensate institutions for the time
spent by their in-house professional staff at market rates.82

77. Fisch, Reform, supra note 15, at 542.
78. Id.
79. Telephone interview with confidential source (Mar. 2003).
80. See, e.g., Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law §§ 9.5.1–9.5.2 (1986) (explaining
infrequency of proxy contests focused on corporate mismanagement in part being due to free
rider problems associated with rationally apathetic stockholders).
81. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 3, at 2110–11.
82. The PSLRA’s provisions provide that “[n]othing in this paragraph shall be construed to
limit the award of reasonable costs and expenses (including lost wages) directly relating to the
representation of the class . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(4) (2000); see also State of Wis. Inv. Bd.
v. Bartlett, No. 17727, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at *22–*23 (Del. Ch. 2002) (denying recovery
and stating that SWIB had enough at stake to merit its involvement without award for costs); cf.
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A number of our survey respondents identified monitoring costs as an
important issue in their decisionmaking process, although their estimates of the
time involved ranged widely from 40 to 100 hours to as much as 250 to 1000
hours for their total involvement through settlement.83 As discussed in the
preceding footnote, we obtained very complete estimates from the general
counsel of a leading institutional investor. Using these estimates and valuing
the institution’s average personnel cost at $100 per hour, which seems quite

Cook v. Niedert, 142 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that factors to be considered in
providing incentive reward to class representative include whether representative’s actions
conferred substantial benefit on class, time and effort expended, and steps representative has
taken to protect class); Brotherton v. Cleveland, 141 F. Supp. 2d 907, 913–14 (S.D. Ohio 2001)
(permitting incentive award of $50,000 to individual class representative for her extensive
participation in what was ultimately successful prosecution of action); Enter. Energy Corp. v.
Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 137 F.R.D. 240, 250–51 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (permitting similar
awards).
83. We asked the general counsel of one leading institutional investor that has acted as lead
plaintiff in a number of cases how much time a lead plaintiff needs to spend on an “average” case.
See Johnson Correspondence, supra note 51. He answered that in securities class actions there
are several stages to the case that can take significant amounts of in-house personnel’s time. In
stage one, the institutional investor must make its initial decision about whether to file a motion to
be named lead plaintiff and then to select lead counsel. He estimated that this part of case
management would take twenty to one hundred hours of its legal staff’s time and two to ten hours
of its investment staff’s time. If the institution is selected as lead plaintiff—an outcome that is
highly likely—it would thereafter assist class counsel in preparing and filing an amended
complaint. To be sure, class counsel would probably do most of this work, but in-house counsel
would still spend five to ten hours, and the investment staff would devote an additional two to
five hours at this point.
Institutions must also spend significant amounts of time helping class counsel brief important
motions. This work is performed almost entirely by the legal staff of the institution, taking
anywhere from five to fifty hours of time. The investment staff’s involvement in this stage would
be minimal, totaling less than two hours. Discovery in all its various aspects can also absorb inhouse legal staff’s time as well as that of the investment staff. This general counsel thought that
legal staff would spend ten to fifty hours on discovery, and the investment staff would be required
to do about an equal amount of work.
If the case proceeds to the point of negotiating a settlement, then both in-house legal staff and
investment staff are typically involved. These negotiations can be quite short or very protracted,
making estimate ranges here fairly broad. Here, our source estimated that legal staff might put in
ten to two hundred hours of time, while investment staff would be needed less (only one to ten
hours). If the case actually goes toward trial, the institutional investor’s staff will be heavily
involved. Legal staff could be employed full time for several weeks with trial preparation.
Investment staff, while less needed, could still spend several days helping with these preparations.
All of this preparation time would be required even though the trial itself is very unlikely to be
held since almost no federal securities class actions go to trial. See Bernard S. Black, Brian R.
Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability 7 (Am. Law & Econ. Ass’n, Working
Paper No. 11, Apr. 2004), available at http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art11 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (showing 1,557 federal securities cases settling out of 2,930 cases filed
from 1991 to June 2003).
Finally, according to our source, the lead plaintiff’s legal staff will need to engage in general
oversight and communication activities throughout the case. This can add up to an additional one
to three hours a month of legal counsel’s time. Over the course of an entire case, this might
amount to a total of twenty to eighty hours of in-house legal staff time per lawsuit.
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low to us, then the cost of a reasonable case management effort by an
institutional investor lead plaintiff in an “average” case would total between
$25,000 and $100,000. Even though some institutional investors believe that
they can double or even quadruple their recovery by serving as active lead
plaintiffs, these are substantial upfront costs to bear relative to the incremental
benefits institutions expect their involvement to yield. Moreover, several of
our survey respondents stated that they had very limited manpower to staff
cases and therefore chose not to become involved as lead plaintiff in many
cases.
An individual investor, or even an aggregation of individuals, is not likely
to engage in the extensive involvement described in the preceding paragraphs
at each of many stages of litigation by an institution. Our data base reflects
that the individual investor is not a repeat player in the process as is the case
with some public pension funds. Moreover, the individual investor is not
likely to have an internal staff to involve it in the monitoring assessments that
occur at multiple stages of the suit’s life. Hence, these monitoring costs are
not sunk costs, as they are in large part with institutions, but rather require the
individuals to devote new resources to the enterprise. In light of these facts,
individuals are likely to underinvest in monitoring. We therefore do not
believe it is likely that lead plaintiffs who are not such a financial institution
are likely to produce gains that approach those associated with a lead plaintiff
who is a financial institution. We empirically test this hypothesis later in this
study.84
Finally, we would be remiss if we did not mention two other important
obstacles to institutional investors becoming lead plaintiffs. First, a number of
our survey respondents noted the lack of information about the case at the very
early stage of the litigation—when they are forced to decide whether to
become lead plaintiffs—as a barrier to serving as class counsel. In essence,
PSLRA gives institutions a maximum of sixty days to make this choice, which
essentially limits the information on which they base their decision to the
complaint, the publicly available information about the company, and the size
of their estimated loss.85 Sixty days appears to be a relatively brief time for
institutional investors to inform themselves fully enough to decide whether to
become a lead plaintiff, especially where the loss estimates generated at this
stage can vary wildly.
Second, many institutions have commercial relationships that may be
jeopardized if they become lead plaintiffs. Even though financial institutions
are not monolithic in their missions or operations, many institutions’ managers

84. See infra Part II.C.
85. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(A)(i)(II) (requiring class members to move to serve as lead
plaintiff within sixty days of notice of complaint); id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i)(II) (same). Given the
type of damage models that they use, the plaintiffs’ lawyers that are trying to persuade institutions
to become involved are likely to overestimate the amount of these losses, which further
complicates the institutions’ situation.
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face conflicts of interest when considering whether to become a lead
plaintiff.86 Banks, mutual funds, and insurance companies—three of the five
largest classes of financial institutions—are each vendors of financial services
and products. Their customers include the corporations and accounting firms
who are the grist of securities class actions. And, to the extent that public
pension funds and endowments appear not to have the same conflicts as other
types of institutions, those conflicts appear when the public pension fund or
endowment depends on outside money managers who have such conflicts.87
These relationships are jeopardized if the institution becomes the lead plaintiff
in a class action focused on its customers or benefactors.
As we have observed elsewhere,88 financial service providers are not
eager to become, or to align themselves with, antagonists of their clientele.89
This observation likely explains why our data contains no settlement where a
bank, mutual fund, or insurance company has served as a lead plaintiff in a
securities class action. Our intuition is that such institutions are generally
unwilling to lead the assault on executives who have issued misleading reports
if such visibility could pose problems in selling financial services to other
executives who likely share the view that most securities class action suits are
strike suits.90 Consorting with “class action lawyers” does not win one friends
in the executive suites of America or at the club.91 Furthermore, there is only
the thinnest social divide between executives of banks, insurance companies,
and mutual funds and executives of industrial firms. These are groups of
individuals who understand one another and who are aware of the price to be
86. See Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions Slip, supra note 5, at 425–28 (explaining social and
commercial forces that prevent banks, mutual funds, and insurance companies from stepping
forward to become lead plaintiffs).
87. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 520, 596–97
(1990) [hereinafter Black, Shareholder Passivity] (observing that some institutional investors
suffer inherent conflicts of interest derivatively through their external advisors who face such
conflicts).
88. See Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions Slip, supra note 5, at 427–28.
89. Thus, we find that many types of financial institutions are not themselves the proponents
of a bylaw or other proposal that will alter the governance of their portfolio companies, although
they will at times vote in favor of such a proposal that is advanced by another, less conflicted
institution. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 811, 883 (1992) (“A bank trust department may not make a
shareholder proposal itself, but the trust department may be able to vote for a proposal by another
institution, especially if corporate managers can’t easily discover how the trust department
voted.”). More pointedly, “for a conflicted institution, crossing the street in a crowd is safer than
crossing alone.” Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 87, at 606.
90. We recognize that an institution may be averse to participating in individual class action
recoveries if it believes that a particular case is just extorting money from a company.
91. The same social and commercial forces that prevent banks, mutual funds, and insurance
companies from stepping forward to be a lead plaintiff may also weaken the commitment of their
managers to assure that the firm reaps the full advantage of securities class action litigation. See
Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions Slip, supra note 5, at 424 (finding in study of 118 securities class
action settlements that 72% of potential claimants in settled class actions fail to submit their
claims).
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incurred by failing to honor that understanding.92 By default, therefore, it is
the public or union pension fund that is most likely to serve as a lead plaintiff
because it is the type of institution not likely to have such a commercial
interest that would be jeopardized by aligning itself with the plaintiffs’ bar.93
As we will see, these are the overwhelming majority of institutional investors
that are appearing as lead plaintiffs in our sample. Thus, there are distinct
imputed costs to becoming a lead plaintiff when the institution is also a vendor
of commercial products to those who may become the targets of future
securities class actions.
D. Forces that Corrupt: Strategies that Circumvent the Objective of the Lead
Plaintiff Provision
The broad objective of the PSLRA’s mechanism for selecting a lead
plaintiff is to place a class member in the lead harness and thus make securities
class actions less lawyer driven. Because of practices described in this section,
this objective, regretfully, may largely remain just a hope and not a reality.
Plaintiff law firms competing to represent the class each have a significant
financial stake in who the court selects as the suit’s lead plaintiff: This
selection customarily means the counsel representing the new lead plaintiff is
appointed to be class counsel. To be sure, the PSLRA does not require this
result because the lead plaintiff provision expressly conditions selection of the
class counsel on approval by the court. Nevertheless, the courts regularly
avoid any “shotgun marriage” between the lead plaintiff and a counsel not
selected by the lead plaintiff.94 We can therefore understand that the winning
strategy for the plaintiffs’ lawyer is to find and befriend an investor or group of
investors who are likely to have substantial financial losses due to the
defendant’s fraudulent acts.
1. “Pay-to-Play” Allegations. — The most obvious place to find such a
high-loss investor is among the ranks of institutional investors. As seen above,
most institutions face commercial restraints on serving as lead plaintiff. Two

92. See William M. O’Barr & John M. Conley with Carolyn Kay Brancato, Fortune and
Folly: The Wealth and Power of Institutional Investing 230–31 (1992) (examining cultural
identities that managers of institutions share with managers of their portfolio companies); cf.
James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and
Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1985, at 83, 85–108
(examining social and psychological forces, among which includes being of same social strata,
that can impede director’s decision to sue another).
93. Labor union shareholder activists often wear two hats, protecting their interests as
shareholders but also furthering their interests as workers. For further discussion of the potential
conflicts of interest that may arise in these situations, and of labor union shareholder activism in
general, see Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance:
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1018, 1074–84 (1998).
94. See In re Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726, 733–35 (9th Cir. 2002) (deciding that selecting
counsel through competitive bidding is inconsistent with PSLRA); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264
F.3d 201, 273–74 (3d Cir. 2001) (same).

LEADPLAINTIFFCOLUMBIAFINAL

2006]

11/8/2006 4:13:16 PM

DOES THE PLAINTIFF MATTER?

125

important exceptions to these commercial restraints are public and labor
pension funds. In theory, a priori considerations that should guide institutions
in selecting a law firm to serve as class counsel include the firm’s reputation
and the formula for determining fees to be awarded counsel for any success in
the suit.
Dimming this idealistic vision of selecting lead counsel are numerous
reports of “pay-to-play” practices pursued by some large plaintiffs’ law
firms.95 A case in point is the Cendant litigation. The lead plaintiffs in
Cendant, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System, the New York
City Pension Funds, and the New York State Common Retirement Fund
(NYSCRF), selected Barrack, Rodos and Bacine (BRB) and Bernstein Litowitz
Berger & Grossman LLP (BLBG) as lead counsel. An elected official, New
York State Comptroller H. Carl McCall, had sole responsibility with respect to
all matters related to NYSCRF, and it was his office that urged the selection of
BRB and BLBG as lead counsel. But Comptroller McCall had received
approximately $100,000 in campaign contributions from three plaintiffs’ law
firms between 1999 and 2001—the relevant period for having selected and
retained counsel in the matter. Two of those contributing law firms were the
two firms selected to be counsel in the Cendant litigation.96 Ultimately
counsel was awarded attorneys’ fees of $55 million in connection with the $3.2
billion settlement of the suit.97 Not surprisingly, in 2002 it was estimated that
BRB and BLBG, their partners, and their families made nearly $200,000 in
campaign donations to McCall.98
Recall that in Cendant, in response to an objection by a lawyer for another
shareholder who was not selected as the lead plaintiff, the district court held an
auction to choose counsel.99 The objector argued that both BRB and BLBG
should be disqualified because they had made political contributions to
McCall.100 The district court permitted both firms to represent the class,
95. Cf. John R. Wilke, Nathan Koppel & Peter Sanders, Milberg Indicted on Charges Firm
Paid Kickbacks, Wall St. J., May 19, 2006, at A1 (reporting federal indictment of nation’s largest
securities class action firm for alleged “kick backs” to individuals who served as plaintiffs in
securities class actions over twenty-year period).
96. See Kevin McCoy, Campaign Contributions or Conflicts of Interest?, USA Today, Sept.
11, 2001, at 1B. The third law firm, Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, was selected by
McCall as lead counsel in the Global Crossings securities class action. See Shaila K. Dewan,
Donors to McCall Profit in Cases State Pursues Against Corporate Wrongdoers, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 14, 2002, at B4. And McCall selected BRB and BLBG to represent the fund as lead
plaintiff in another large class action, McKesson HBOC, Inc. Id. Since BRB is based in
Philadelphia, its support of a public official of another state, who aspired only to office in that
state, supports our unease that the purpose of BRB’s campaign contribution was driven by
commercial and not civic objectives.
97. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 243 F. Supp. 2d 166, 174 (D.N.J. 2003), aff’d, 404 F.3d
173 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that $55 million in attorneys’ fees requested by lead counsel is “not
clearly excessive”).
98. See Dewan, supra note 96.
99. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d at 270–72.
100. See id. at 269.
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provided they would agree to match the low bid.101 Not surprisingly, they
agreed because the low bid they were asked to match was $75 million greater
than the fee they had negotiated with the three lead plaintiffs.102
Interestingly, McCall chose not to appeal the higher fee award; the appeal
instead was brought by the New York City Pension Funds, for whom there
were no reports of campaign contributions. The Third Circuit reversed the
award, remanded the case to the district court with suggestions that a lower
figure was in order, and dealt obliquely with the possible corrupting influences
of campaign contributions to McCall.103 The court suggested that “in cases
where the court determines that a publicly-managed fund is the presumptively
most adequate plaintiff, the court could properly require that the fund disclose
any campaign contributions by the fund’s choice of counsel to any elected
officials possessing direct oversight and authority over the fund.”104
The odor of corruption surrounds more than Mr. McCall’s choice of
counsel in Cendant and other instances when NYSCRF has been appointed
lead plaintiff.105 Milberg Weiss, the leading securities class action plaintiffs’
firm, has repeatedly been mired in controversy over whether it secures the
support of public institutions through political or other contributions to
decisionmakers.106 And in a news account based on examination of campaign
finance records in five states and two cities, reporters found not only a
substantial increase in campaign contributions in Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and
New York following the enactment of the PSLRA and its lead plaintiff
provision, but a correlation between the contributing law firms and the funds’
selection of these firms to represent the fund as counsel in suits where the fund
served as lead plaintiff.107

101. See id. at 219–20 (discussing district court’s counsel selection process).
102. See id. at 272 n.50.
103. See id. at 220–21.
104. Id. at 270 n.49 (emphasis added).
105. See id. at 230–31. In this regard, New York State Comptroller Alan Hevesi chose
BRB and BLBG to represent the municipal pension system as lead plaintiff in the securities class
action arising out of the accounting scandal of WorldCom. In combination the two firms
contributed $42,900 to Hevesi’s campaign. See Editorial, Citigroup Wake-Up Call, N.Y. Sun,
May 11, 2004, at 10.
106. See, e.g., Josh Gerstein, Huge Class-Action Law Firm Splits After Dispute, N.Y. Sun,
May 4, 2004, at 1 (reporting grand jury investigation of Milberg Weiss’s efforts to obtain
business from Philadelphia city controller); N.Y.’s Milberg Weiss Faces 2nd Investigation, N.Y.
Law., Feb. 27, 2002, at http://www.nylawyer.com/news/02/02/022702f.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (reporting grand jury investigation into whether Milberg Weiss
representatives had made contributions to Philadelphia City Controller to secure appointments as
lead counsel in securities class actions).
107. See McCoy, supra note 96. For example, Louisiana State Treasurer Ken Duncan, who
oversaw the state retirement funds, received no contributions from securities class action law
firms in his campaign in 1995, but four years later several such law firms were his biggest
contributors. Id. He lost that election to John Kennedy, who, unlike Caesar’s wife, reported
receiving a campaign contribution from a Boston law firm that Kennedy later selected to
represent a Louisiana teachers’ pension fund in the lucrative settlement of a suit against Summitt
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Plaintiffs’ side securities law firms are also said to have recently begun
employing lobbyists to assist them in their efforts to obtain the lead counsel
position. Of course, many businesses in the United States hire lobbyists, and
they are widely employed to engage in a broad variety of activities, such as
fighting adverse legislation and promoting good public relations. However, we
were informed by several public pension fund officials that at least some of
these lobbyists are engaged in efforts to persuade funds to assume the lead
plaintiff position in securities fraud class actions and retain the law firm to act
as lead counsel. To determine the veracity of this claim, we decided to see
how widespread this activity was amongst the leading plaintiffs’ law firms.
We visited the lobbyist disclosure web sites for all fifty states to see if any of
the best-known plaintiffs’ law firms had disclosed hiring lobbyists and, if so,
how much they paid them.108 Our search turned up six states where the bestknown plaintiffs’ securities class action law firms109 had made such
disclosures.110 Three law firms have disclosed hiring lobbyists: Milberg
Weiss,111 Abbey Gardy and Squitieri,112 and Bernstein Liebhard and
Technology. Id. Similarly, Kennedy selected as counsel in the Gateway and Lucent cases a New
York-based firm that had made a substantial contribution to his campaign. Id.
108. Where possible, we tracked down how much these firms paid their lobbyist in a given
state using the information provided on that state’s website. If the state’s website did not provide
that information, we called the state agency to inquire whether that information was available
from another source. Each state agency that we called indicated that it does not track how much
lobbyists are paid by their employer. The poor accessibility and quality of the data that is
available through some of these sites make it possible that we missed some firms. We did not
examine any of the U.S. territories, Puerto Rico, or Washington, D.C.
109. We searched for sixteen law firms that are actively engaged in shareholder litigation.
These firms were identified in an earlier study by one of the authors. See Thompson & Thomas,
supra note 6, at 186–87 tbl.12. While these firms are not the only plaintiffs’ law firms bringing
securities fraud class actions, they file a large percentage of these cases. See id. at 186 & n.199.
110. We began at the website for the Center for Public Integrity (CFPI). See Ctr. for Pub.
Integrity, http://www.publicintegrity.org/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 6, 2006). The CFPI site
contains links to the state agencies in every state that monitor lobbying efforts at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/information.aspx (last visited Sept. 6, 2006) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review). This page also indicates whether a particular state tracks
executive lobbyists, legislative lobbyists, or all lobbyists. Using the links provided, we searched
every state’s website for information on lobbyists and their employers. Where possible, we
downloaded any reports that provided information on lobbyists and their employers. Then we
searched those reports for the sixteen plaintiffs’ firms identified in our discussion. Some states do
not allow reports to be downloaded. Instead, those states have search engines that allow
searching of the lobbyist registration data. In those states, we searched using their search engines.
We also searched for lobbyist information in every state using the popular search engine Google,
at http://www.google.com (last visited Sept. 18, 2006).
111. See Alaska Pub. Offices Comm’n, 2002 Employer Year-End Summary 15 (2002),
available at http://www.state.ak.us/apoc/pdf/02empsum.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (disclosing $84,000 in 2002); Alaska Pub. Offices Comm’n, 2003 Employer Year-End
Summary 16 (2003), available at http://www.state.ak.us/apoc/pdf/03empYEsum.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (disclosing $84,000 in 2003); Alaska Pub. Offices Comm’n, 2004
Employer
Year
End
Summary
15
(2004),
available
at
http://www.state.ak.us/apoc/pdf/04empyesum.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(disclosing $21,000 in 2004); Cal. Sec’y of State, Lobbying Activity: Milberg Weiss Bershad
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Lifshitz.113
To the extent that plaintiffs’ class action firms engage in this behavior, it
appears to be just part of a larger tapestry of pay-to-play practices by law firms
generally.114 This practice is not well regulated, even though the American
Bar Association’s position is that “[a] lawyer or law firm shall not accept a
government legal engagement or an appointment by a judge if the lawyer or
law firm makes a political contribution or solicits political contributions for the
purpose of obtaining or being considered for that type of legal engagement or
appointment.”115 In addition to the obvious difficulty of proving in any
disciplinary proceeding that a contribution was made for the avowed purpose
of securing future appointment as lead counsel, the ABA’s position is further
weakened because no state has made this statement a part of its rules of
professional conduct. What would surely be more effective would be a total
bar to the appointment of a law firm that has made a political contribution to a
governmental official who could influence the choice of counsel to represent a
governmental fund in a securities suit. Such an approach has analogues in
other areas, with a virtually identical rule adopted by the Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board to govern relationships between broker-dealers who
underwrite municipal securities and the elected officials who select the
underwriters.116 An equally well-informed response is that followed in a few
states that have placed the counsel-selecting decision in the hands of
nonpartisan boards, and not in the hands of elected officials.117 A third,

Hynes
&
Lerach,
at
http://calaccess.ss.ca.gov/Lobbying/Employers/Detail.aspx?id=1143713&session=2003&view=activity
(last visited Oct. 5, 2006) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (disclosing $181,000 in 2003–
2004).
112. See N.Y. State Temp. Comm’n on Lobbying, Client Semi-Annual Report: Abbey
Gardy, at https://www.nytscol.org/Data_CSRQuery.asp?ID=1801&CSRID=1199 (last visited
Sept. 6, 2006) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (disclosing $30,000 in 2003).
113. See Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, supra note 110 (providing links to Arkansas, Illinois, and
Ohio websites).
114. See Michael Higgins, Pondering “Pay-to-Play”: ABA Scrutinizes Link Between
Campaign Contributions and Legal Work, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1997, at 96, 96 (offering as one of
several examples that thirty-three lawyers, whose firms together held approximately 70% of
state’s bond work, each pledged $25,000 to reelect Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge). Similar
connections appear to hold in New York and New Jersey. See id.
115. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 7.6 (2006) (emphasis added).
116. See Mun. Sec. Rulemaking Bd. Rule G-37(b)(i) (2005), available at
http://www.msrb.org/msrb1/rules/ruleg37.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(prohibiting broker-dealers from engaging in municipal securities business for issuer if brokerdealer, its associates, or committee controlled by broker-dealer has made political contributions to
official of issuer within two years). See generally Jon B. Jordan, The Regulation of “Pay-toPlay” and the Influence of Political Contributions in the Municipal Securities Industry, 1999
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 489 (discussing rise and fall of “pay-to-play” and how dealers who make
political contributions can influence elected officials to select them for municipal bond business).
117. See Diana B. Henriques, Conflict over Conflicts: Class-Action Lawyers Defend Their
Political Contributions, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1998, at D1 (detailing, for example, that State of
Wisconsin Investment Board created four-member nonpartisan panel consisting of its assistant
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perhaps more easily implemented, response tracks the lines suggested by the
Third Circuit in the Cendant litigation:118 Federal courts could routinely
require the disclosure of all campaign contributions made by the plaintiffs’
counsel to any official associated with an institutional investor applying for a
lead plaintiff position. The court could then decide if these contributions
should influence its decision about the appointment of lead counsel.
2. Who Wins the Beauty Contest? — When the contest to be designated
the lead plaintiff is between a financial institution, an individual, a group of
individuals, or a nonfinancial institution, the courts with great consistency
prefer the financial institution over others.119 This demonstrative preference is
driven largely by the institution being the single claimant with the largest loss.
Despite this recognized strong preference on the part of the courts and the
potential benefits of financial institutions becoming a lead plaintiff, financial
institutions have not swollen the ranks of those petitioning to be a lead
plaintiff.120 Two early studies illustrate this point. The first, an SEC study of
legal counsel, in-house investment manager, representative of Attorney General, and local lawyer
noted for litigation experience).
118. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 270 n.49 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that
court should inquire of publicly managed fund seeking to be designated as lead plaintiff whether
contributions have been made and, if so, how fund selected contributing counsel as suit’s
counsel).
119. Gluck v. Cellstar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542 (N.D. Tex. 1997), addresses potential
conflicts posed by selecting as lead plaintiff an institution that has the largest claim and also
continues to own shares in the defendant corporation. Gluck concludes that, even though a
conflict may cause the institution to prefer a more moderate settlement than would be preferred if
the petitioner did not continue as stockholder, this conflict is not disabling because Congress
envisioned that longer term corporate interests would be taken into consideration by the lead
plaintiff in guiding terms of the settlement. Id. at 547–49.
120. See PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, supra note 11, at 7 (documenting that institutional
investors represent only 14% of lead plaintiffs in recent securities litigation); Coffee, Litigation
Governance, supra note 9, at 806 n.7 (explaining that few institutional investors are willing to
serve as lead plaintiffs and concluding that costs of such role likely exceed benefits for
institutional investors); John P. Coffey & John C. Browne, The Results Are in . . . Class Action
Settlements Are Significantly Higher When Institutional Investors Act as Lead Plaintiffs,
Institutional Investor Advoc. (Bernstein Litowitz Berge & Grossman, New York, N.Y.), Second
Quarter 2004, at 3, 3, available at http://www.blbglaw.com/advocate/adv2004Q2.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (“Less than a decade ago, most institutional investors would have
scoffed at a suggestion that they seek to be appointed as lead plaintiff in a securities class action
lawsuit.”). Despite the probable positive effects institutions can have on settlements, there is no
definitive legal compulsion that they so involve themselves. See, e.g., Craig C. Martin & Mathew
H. Metcalf, The Fiduciary Duties of Institutional Investors in Securities Litigation, 56 Bus. Law.
1381, 1404–08 (2001) (reviewing fiduciary duties of pension fund managers without identifying
obligation to become lead plaintiff, but emphasizing obligations of managers once becoming lead
plaintiff).
There is some evidence that recently institutional investors have become increasingly
interested in becoming lead plaintiffs. See, e.g., Fisch, Aggregation, supra note 6, at 61–62
(explaining that, due to adoption of lead plaintiff provision, “[a]n increasing number of
institutional investors are seeking appointments as lead plaintiff”); Adam C. Pritchard, Should
Congress Repeal Securities Class Action Reform 8 (Cato Inst., Policy Analysis No. 471, 2003),
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa471.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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the first year’s experiences under PSLRA, found that in the 105 securities
fraud class actions the Commission’s staff examined, institutional investors
moved to become lead plaintiffs in only eight cases.121 Later findings indicate
that, in 1997, institutional investors appeared as lead plaintiffs in securities
fraud class actions in only nine out of 175 cases examined.122 If we add the
results of these two studies together, we find that over the two year interval
1996–1997, institutions sought lead counsel status in only seventeen out of 280
cases—only about 6% of the cases studied.
With the realm of prospective financial institutions to serve as lead
plaintiffs being largely limited to public or labor pension funds, a far more
prevalent strategy attorneys pursue to become class counsel is to assemble a
group of investors who, hopefully, have the largest aggregate financial loss
among those petitioning to be selected as lead plaintiff. The PSLRA explicitly
refers to the lead plaintiff as a “person or group of persons,”123 even though
the legislative history of the PSLRA is fairly compelling that Congress’s vision
of the lead plaintiff was a nonaggregated large holder—namely a financial
institution.124 This may well cause us to wonder if “persons,” as used in the
act, poorly expresses Congress’s vision because the plural usage was never
intended to include natural persons but institutions.
Considering that the weakness the PSLRA’s lead plaintiff provision
sought to address was the class representative’s poor incentives to monitor the
suit’s prosecution because of a small economic incentive, this interpretation
becomes more compelling. It is difficult for us to understand how this concern
is overcome by aggregation of claimants, especially when each member of the
group has a relatively small claim. Indeed, aggregation likely makes the
problem worse, not better. The aggregation of several small claimants carries
forward the problems present when a single small claimant is the suit’s
(“[Due to the PSLRA,] institutional investors are now starting to step forward in greater numbers
to take charge of securities fraud class actions.”). Prior to 2002, the support for this claim was
largely anecdotal and based on citations to particular instances in which institutions have
petitioned to be named lead counsel. During this time period, out of all of the potential
institutions that could act as lead plaintiffs, “only public pension funds, and a limited number of
union-related institutions, [had] been willing to serve as lead plaintiffs.” Coffee, Litigation
Governance, supra note 9, at 806 n.7. Private pension funds and mutual funds are conspicuously
absent from the lead plaintiff positions. See id.
121. Office of the Gen. Counsel, Report to the President and Congress, supra note 54.
122. See Coffee, Litigation Governance, supra note 9, at 807 n.7 (citing Elayne Demby,
Ducking Lead Plaintiff Status, Plan Sponsor, May 1999, at http://www.plansponsor.com (on file
with the Columbia Law Review)).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (2000) (emphasis added).
124. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 34 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 733 (lamenting that pre-PSLRA system “works to prevent institutional
investors from selecting counsel or serving as lead plaintiff[s]” and expressing hope that
“increasing the role of institutional investors in class actions will ultimately benefit shareholders
and assist courts”); S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 6 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685
(stating hope that legislation will increase role of institutional investors in securities class
actions).
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representative and also adds a new problem: When several individuals are the
suit’s representatives, they face a collective action problem in coordinating
their monitoring of the class counsel.125 Moreover, we cannot envision that a
member of a group will have a stronger incentive to monitor the conduct of the
suit than she would have as a single class representative, so there is every
reason to expect a good deal of free riding behavior within such a group. Thus,
the aggregation approach, even though quite well received among the courts,
strikes us as being inconsistent with the rationale of the lead plaintiff provision.
For the reasons stated above, aggregation likely yields a lead plaintiff that has
no greater incentive than that of an individual investor whose loss equals that
of the group’s largest member.
Reflecting on over ten years’ experience with the PSLRA’s lead plaintiff
provision raises fascinating questions about whether its impact has been
positive. There is no doubt that political officers benefit from law firms’ quest
for a public pension fund that will dispense its favor by first stepping forward
to be a lead plaintiff and, if selected, next nominating as the class counsel a law
firm that is a patron of its political officers. But is this beneficial to either the
process or society more generally? Most certainly the PSLRA was not enacted
to create further angst over how political fundraising might compromise the
judgment and trust of elected officials. Similarly, just as it is problematic to
believe that an individual investor with a small financial stake in a class
action’s outcome will be a vigilant monitor of the suit’s prosecution and
ultimate settlement, it is equally doubtful that a group of individuals will be
more diligent than the single individual class representative. Admittedly, our
misgivings about each of these outcomes are based solely on reason alone. But
following Holmes’s admonition,126 we believe the real answer to this question
lies in experience, not logic. Accordingly, we now turn to the empirical
evidence we have gathered that bears not just on the contribution, if any, made
by lead plaintiffs but also on whether the type of lead plaintiff matters.
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE LEAD PLAINTIFF
PROVISION
The empirical evidence concerning the lead plaintiff provision that has

125. See, e.g., In re Critical Path, Inc. Sec. Litig., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1109, 1111 (N.D.
Cal. 2001) (requiring preexisting relationship for institutions and individuals collectively to serve
as lead plaintiff, even though group’s alleged losses exceeded $14 million); In re Landry’s
Seafood Rest., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. H-99-1948, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7005, at *15–*16 (S.D.
Tex. Mar. 30, 2000) (denying aggregation by reasoning, in part, that too loose affiliation among
class representatives will result in manipulation by attorneys); In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67
F. Supp. 2d 803, 815–16 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (denying aggregation because coordination costs of
members with no prior relationship would render effective monitoring of counsel unlikely).
126. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881) (“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience.”).
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been marshaled to date in the academic literature has been very limited.127 In
the remainder of this study, we contribute to this body of knowledge by
analyzing publicly available electronic databases of court decisions,
proprietary databases from securities claims administrators,128 and information
that we collected about securities fraud class actions.
A. Courts’ Preference for Institutional Investors in Disputed Situations
Courts have been asked to decide numerous controversies over which
investors should be selected as lead plaintiff. In order to determine
systematically how institutional investors have fared in the battle to be named
lead plaintiff, we conducted a survey of all court decisions about the selection
of a lead plaintiff. We searched the Westlaw and Lexis electronic libraries for
all opinions relating to the court’s appointment of a lead plaintiff for the time
period from January 1, 1996, to December 31, 2004. We found 129 decisions
in which a court was asked to appoint a lead plaintiff. We then read them and
classified the decisions in Table 1 below. Included within the data in Table 1
are a number of cases where there is only one petitioner for the position of lead
plaintiff. Thus, among the fifty cases in the category “Cases Without an
Institutional Investor Petitioner,” there are seventeen cases where there was
only one petitioner. Furthermore, in the category “Single/Multiple Institutions
Selected Over Individuals/Groups, or No Competing Petitioner,” there are
seven cases where only a single institution applied for the lead plaintiff
position.
Table 1: Outcomes of Judicial Decisions Appointing Lead Plaintiff
Type of Investors
Cases Without an Institutional Investor Petitioner
Cases with Multiple Institutional Investors Petitioning:
Single Institution Selected
Single/Multiple
Institutions
Selected
over
Individuals/Groups, or No Competing Petitioner
Institution and Individual Selected over Competing

Number
of Cases
50
38
24
8

127. In addition to our work, two recent working papers by other legal academics will help
to fill this gap. See Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, Do Institutions Matter? The
Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 1 (N.Y.U.
Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 04-08, 2005), available at
http://www.luc.edu/law/faculty/facworkshops/fisch_do_institutions_matter.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (finding that public pension fund lead plaintiffs are correlated with higher
class recoveries than other types of lead plaintiffs, including private institutional lead plaintiffs);
Perino, supra note 42, at 34 (finding that public pension funds negotiate lower attorneys’ fees than
other types of lead plaintiffs in securities fraud class actions).
128. For a more detailed discussion of the data we obtained from claims administrators, see
Cox & Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table, supra note 5, at 871–74.
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Individuals/Groups/Institutions
Cases with Institutional Investor(s) and Competing
Individual/Group of Individuals Petitioning: Individual or
Group Selected
Total Number of Cases

133
9

129

This data reflects the courts’ preference for institutional investors as lead
plaintiffs. Courts found in their favor in the vast majority of cases in which an
institutional investor was competing for the position of lead counsel.
However, there are two important caveats to this statement. First, courts were
willing to select groups of individuals over institutions in situations where the
institutions did not have large shareholdings in the company that was the
subject of the litigation, especially where the court exhibited concerns about
the typicality of the institutional investor as a class representative. Second, in
several cases courts accepted groups of institutions and individuals over their
competitors where they found such groups to have the largest stake in the
defendant company. Both of these situations appear to reflect continued
judicial acceptance of groups as effective monitors of plaintiffs’ counsel in
securities fraud class actions, a preference which we have earlier noted seems
questionable to us.
B. Size of Claim and Type of Lead Plaintiffs
In a pair of earlier studies of claims filing behavior in securities fraud
class actions, we obtained confidential data concerning the size of
stockholdings for a large group of securities fraud class action settlements
covering the time period 1996–1998.129 Using this data, we identified the lead
plaintiffs, the size of their claims in the settlements, and the percentage of all
claims that these institutions held in thirty-five post-PSLRA cases. Table 2
below presents this information for four different types of lead plaintiffs:
public pension funds, other institutional lead plaintiffs, single individuals, and
groups of individuals. The sample size is small, and the cases included are
selected solely on the basis of having complete data, so the observations made
below must be viewed as descriptive.
Table 2: Lead Plaintiff Claims in Securities Fraud Class Actions

129. See id.; Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions Slip, supra note 5, at 421–24 tbl.1 (reporting
purchase activity and settlement data during class period).
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Average
Percentage
of
Lead
Plaintiff’s
Claim Out
of
Total
Settlement
Claims132

Average
Total
Settlement
Amount
(Including
Valuation
of
Securities)
133

Public
Pension
Fund
Lead
Plaintiff
Other
Type of
Institutio
nal Lead
Plaintiff
Individu
al Lead
Plaintiff
Groups
of
Individu
als

3

9,217,290

228,956,932

4.025%

17,183,333

2

505,154

269,574,988

0.18%

28,150,000

52,461

45,238,397

0.11%

6,863,028

349,808

32,785,285

1.066%

8,068,841

21

9

130. The values in this column are calculated by aggregating the claims of each lead
plaintiff and then calculating the average value. For example, for public pension fund lead
plaintiffs, the claims of the three funds were $7,040,077; $16,709,600; and $3,902,195, for the
three cases in this category. The average of these three cases is $9,217,290. However, for the
groups of individuals category, we treated each group as a single observation and made
calculations on a per group basis.
131. The values in this column are calculated by aggregating the total settlement claims for
each separate case and then calculating an average value for the category. For example, in the
public pension fund lead plaintiff category, the total amount of claims in the three cases was
$25,633,658; $62,681,470; and $598,555,670, respectively. The average of these three values is
$228,956,932. With the groups of individuals category, we treated each group as a single
observation and calculated values on a per group basis.
132. The values in this column are calculated by dividing the value in the “Average Dollar
Amount of Lead Plaintiff’s Claim” column by the value in the “Average Total Dollar Amount of
Settlement Claims” column.
133. For this column, we added together the actual dollar settlement amount for each case in
the category, then divided by the number of observations in the category. For instance, for the
public pension fund lead plaintiff category the dollar settlement amounts were $14,500,000;
$21,150,000; and $15,900,000, respectively. The average for these three cases is $17,183,333.
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Beginning with the public pension fund cases, in two of these actions the
lead plaintiff was the largest stakeholder in the case, holding over 25% of the
claims made in the case. These cases are indicative of the type of lead plaintiff
that Congress envisioned when it enacted this provision. The third case also
featured a lead plaintiff with a large dollar stake in the litigation ($3.9 million),
but, given the extremely large settlement size, this plaintiff held a relatively
small percentage (0.65%) of the total claims made in the case.
Each of these lead plaintiffs had at least several million dollars at stake in
the litigation. Such large claimants may be able to justify incurring substantial
monitoring costs if they will receive potentially larger benefits in any
settlement. For example, if a lead plaintiff incurs between $25,000 and
$100,000 in monitoring costs134 as a result of taking on that responsibility, this
would only represent about 0.25% to 1% of the three institutions’ average total
losses ($9,217,290) in these cases. For an institution engaging ex ante in a
cost-benefit analysis of the value of the lead plaintiff position, this suggests
that even a slightly optimistic assessment of the increased settlement value
could result in a positive decision.
The economics of actively monitoring class counsel are more problematic
for the two other institutional investors that have acted as lead plaintiffs. The
first case involved a single institutional investor (an insurance company) where
the lead plaintiff’s total stake in the litigation was so small ($40,000) that it
could rationally only support the absolute minimum amount of monitoring
possible. In the second case, where the lead plaintiffs were an institutional
investor (a labor fund) joined by an individual investor, the potential for
monitoring was a bit more promising, although the size of their individual
stakes were correspondingly smaller than in the other cases previously
discussed.135
Next, we consider the minimum size of claim that it would make sense to
pursue. First, we estimate conservatively that there was an approximately 10%
average recovery rate for losses in securities fraud settlements during this time
period.136 Thus, if an institution had a $1 million claim, it would expect to
134. These costs will vary substantially depending on the case and the level of monitoring
by the institution. One well-known institutional investor estimated that, in an “average” case, an
institution incurs between $25,000 and $100,000 of unreimbursed staff time actively monitoring
the cases in which it is lead plaintiff. See Johnson Correspondence, supra note 51; see also supra
note 83 and accompanying text (describing basis for this estimate).
135. As we discussed more fully above, we believe that there are serious collective action
problems with allowing aggregation of lead plaintiffs. See supra Part I.D.2.
136. For our sample in this study, we found that the average is 12.7% for the complete
sample, 13.5% in the pre-PSLRA sample, and 12.3% in the post-PSLRA sample. However, for
purposes of illustration, we use the more conservative 10% value. Compare this approach with
Alison Beard, Shareholders Demand Their Day in Court, Fin. Times, July 11, 2002, at 28
(summarizing Cornerstone Research study finding that plaintiffs are recovering 5.1% of total
damages post-PSLRA), and Wager & Ward, supra note 23, at 18 (“Median settlement is less than
6 percent of investors’ alleged losses.”). The enormous divergence among damage estimates in
securities fraud class actions may arise because of differences in their underlying assumptions.
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recover about $100,000 from this claim. If we assume that an institution can
double this recovery rate by taking an active lead plaintiff role, then this would
generate an additional $100,000 in value on a $1 million claim. However,
even this may not be a sufficient incentive to overcome the uncertainty of the
expected benefits of being an active lead plaintiff. In any event, this analysis
suggests that a minimum claim size of $1 million is necessary for an institution
to give serious consideration to becoming a lead plaintiff. Risk-averse
institutions might choose a higher multiple to be sure of recouping their
costs137 or to allocate scarce administrative resources more efficiently.138
For the single individual lead plaintiffs, we see that these class
representatives have small dollar and percentage stakes in their respective
cases. However, we suspect that competition, or potential competition, for this
role today has resulted in the appointment of individual lead plaintiffs with
larger stakes than was seen earlier. It seems apparent that these claimants
cannot be realistically expected to engage in costly monitoring of class
counsel.
Finally, for the groups of individuals acting as lead plaintiffs, we observe
that the average dollar size of the group of claims is larger than with the
individual lead plaintiffs. However, the size of the average individual claim
for all group members is only $89,950.139 While this is larger than the amount
reported for individual lead plaintiffs, it is well below the level where we
would expect significant monitoring of class counsel. Also, these groups must
overcome greater coordination problems in negotiating with and monitoring
class counsel.
We conclude that the evidence we have presented, which is admittedly for
a very small sample of cases, provides some support for the idea that public
pension fund lead plaintiffs have the most potential to improve client
monitoring of class counsel.
C. Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision
To supplement the above analysis, we empirically test several hypotheses
about the possible impact of the lead plaintiff provision. Our data set of 388
class actions was assembled from a variety of sources, including various
claims administrators, a private consulting firm that provides litigation support
For a discussion of our methodology and its underlying assumptions, see Cox & Thomas, SEC
Heuristics, supra note 8, at 768 n.100.
137. A risk-averse institution will want to recover more than the amount of its actual
expenses to compensate itself for bearing the added uncertainty and costs of being an active lead
plaintiff.
138. One institutional investor has told us that because of staffing limits, it can only take on
one or two cases at a time. To focus on the biggest impact cases, its threshold claim for
considering a lead plaintiff position is $7 million. See Johnson Correspondence, supra note 51.
139. We calculated the average claim for each of the individual groups and then averaged
the averages.
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for securities fraud suits, and information about settlements obtained from
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS).140
1. Descriptive Statistics. — Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for our
sample. Panel A separates the 388 cases in our sample141 into pre-PSLRA and
post-PSLRA cases, with the post-PSLRA cases broken into five categories of
lead plaintiff. Panel B, sorting cases by year of filing, shows that the vast bulk
of cases were filed between 1993 and 2002.142
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A

Description

Count

Percent143

Type of Lead Plaintiff

Pre-PSLRA Cases

128

33.0

1

Single Institution

34

8.8

2

Group of Individuals

106

27.3

3

Institution-Individuals

12

3.1

4

Single Individual

50

12.9

5

Entity

58

15.0

Total

All Types of Lead Plaintiffs

388

100

Panel B

Year Complaint Filed

Count

Percent

1989–1992

14

3.6

1993–1995
1996–1999

109
180

28.3
46.8

2000–2002
Total

82
385

21.3
100

Roughly one-third of the sample is comprised of pre-PSLRA settlements,

140. We would like to thank ISS, the National Economic Research Associates (NERA), and
several claims administrators (who requested anonymity) for their willingness to share this data.
141. We excluded cases where the only defendant was an accounting firm and it was not
possible to identify the firm that was the auditor’s client. One potential impact of this is to reduce
the settlement amount recovered in cases involving their audit clients because the accounting
firms’ contribution to the settlement would be excluded. However, there were only four of these
settlements.
142. While we are missing the exact date of three settlements, we can nevertheless classify
them as pre- or post-PSLRA because we have other information about the case, such as the dates
of the class period.
143. We rounded these values off to the nearest tenth of a percent. As a result, the total
does not add up to exactly 100%.
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while the remaining two-thirds are from the post-PSLRA period. For the postPSLRA cases, Category 1 (single institutional lead plaintiff)144 and Category 3
(institution and one or more individuals) are frequently combined for analytical
purposes under the general rubric of “Institutional Lead Plaintiff.” Together,
these two groups make up slightly less than 18% of our post-PSRLA sample
(forty-six cases), or nearly 12% of the entire sample. Groups of individuals
constitute the largest single type of lead plaintiff in the sample, comprising
nearly 41% of the post-PSLRA settlements (27.3% overall) or 106 cases.
Individuals and entities145 make up the rest of the cases with 12.9% (fifty
cases) and 22% (fifty-eight cases), respectively, of the post-PSLRA data set.
For the cases in the sample, Table 4 describes settlement amounts in
thousands of dollars, cutting the sample into pre- and post-PSLRA cases (Panel
A), post-PSLRA cases by type of lead plaintiff (Panel B), and institutional lead
plaintiffs versus other groups (Panel C). Panel A shows that pre-PSLRA cases
have an average settlement value of about $10 million and a median settlement
value of $5.5 million. In comparison, post-PSLRA cases in our sample have a
much larger mean value for settlements, although they have about the same
median value. Differences in these means and medians are not statistically
significant at traditional levels.146
[INSERT TABLE 4]
In Panel B, we see that Categories 1 and 3 exhibit mean settlements of
more than $37 million (median $20.75 million) and $90 million (median
$20.075 million), respectively. By comparison, the total settlement values
displayed for groups of individuals, single individuals, and entities do not
appear very different from that observed prior to the passage of the PSLRA.

144. “Institutional lead plaintiff” as used in our analysis of the sample refers to a lead
plaintiff that could clearly be identified as a financial institution in the classic sense of an
insurance company, bank, pension fund, mutual fund, endowment, or foundation. As we
reviewed documents to identify the suit’s plaintiff, we removed from such classification natural
persons or entities that from their title did not identify the entity as fitting within one of these
categories.
145. “Entities” are defined as cases where there is no identifiable financial institution or
pension fund, but we see a lead plaintiff that is not a natural person. Some examples would be
partnerships and individual trusts. Some of the cases in this category also have named individuals
as co-lead plaintiffs. We have, therefore, confined financial institutions to the classic description
(i.e., banks, pension and mutual funds, insurers, foundations, and endowments) out of necessity
since there is not publicly available information by which we could determine if any entity was
likely of a size equal to what Congress envisioned when it contemplated the lead plaintiff
provision would best be used by “institutional” investors.
146. To preserve the readability of these summary statistics, we do not provide p-values in
all tables that present summary statistics of the data. Instead we discuss the most important
equality hypotheses in the text and support them with the appropriate p-values.
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Panel C illustrates starkly that institutional investor cases exhibit much
larger settlements. When we test for statistical significance, comparing panels
A and C, we find that settlements involving an institutional investor lead
plaintiff are statistically larger than those for the pre-PSLRA cases and for
other groups post-PSLRA. However, the mean and median of the pre-PSLRA
cases are not statistically different from those in all noninstitutional investor
post-PSLRA cases. This suggests the PSLRA’s impact on settlements may be
limited to cases involving institutional lead plaintiffs.
One possible explanation for this result might be that institutional
investors appear in bigger, higher quality cases. To investigate this hypothesis,
we look first at whether institutional investors appear as lead plaintiffs in cases
where more investors are harmed. As a proxy for the number of investors
harmed, we use the length of the class period because it should be correlated
with the number of investors trading in the security during the alleged fraud.
Table 5 presents data on the length of the class period for the different types of
lead plaintiffs, with the bottom row providing information on all institutional
lead plaintiffs.
[INSERT TABLE 5]
Table 5 shows that institutional lead plaintiffs appear in cases with
statistically longer class periods. We find that there is no significant difference
between the length of class periods for the pre-PSLRA cases and Categories 2,
4, and 5 of the post-PSLRA cases. This again suggests that only the
institutional lead plaintiff cases are different.
Looking deeper at the question of why institutional investor lead plaintiffs
obtain better settlements, Table 6 provides data about the market capitalization
of defendant firms in securities fraud class actions. Larger companies have
more resources to pay settlements and a larger trading volume that can lead to
greater damage claims. The data shows the same pattern as in the previous two
tables: Institutional lead plaintiffs sue significantly larger companies than all
other groups of lead plaintiffs, and the sizes of defendants sued in pre-PSLRA
and post-PSLRA cases are not statistically different.
Table 6: Market Capitalization of Defendant Companies (millions of dollars)
Plaintiff Type

Mean

Median

# of observations

Pre-PSLRA

930

185

121

Post-PSLRA

3,345

223

230

(1) Institution

4,482

1,782

28

(2) Group of Individuals

1,487

189

94
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(3) Institution-Individuals

36,262

10,753

11

(4) Single Individual

413

184

46

(5) Entity

1,693

207

51

Total

2,513

215

351

Institutional Lead Plaintiffs: Categories 1 & 3

13,446

1,875

39

A third possible explanation for institutional investors’ greater settlements
is that they bring cases with greater damages. Damage calculations in
securities fraud cases involve complex estimations of the amount of the
shareholders’ provable losses. Using a model we developed earlier for
estimating provable losses,147 we calculated these values for each case in our
sample.
Table 7: Estimated Provable Losses (millions of dollars)
Table 7: Panel A
Pre-PSLRA

Mean
380.4

Median
57.1

# of observations
128

Post-PSLRA

982.2

131.4

260

(1) Institution

3123.9

417.1

34

(2) Group of Individuals

380.8

91.8

106

(3) Institution-Individuals

6,352.8

1,817.8

12

(4) Single Individual

197.8

76.1

50

(5) Entity

391.0

148.5

58

Total
783.7
91.1
388
Table 7: Panel B
Mean
Median
# of observations
Pre-PSLRA
380.2
57.1
128
Institutional Lead Plaintiff: Groups 1 & 3
3,966.2
492.2
46
All Other Lead Plaintiffs Post-PSLRA
340.9
91.8
214
In Table 7, Panel A shows estimated provable losses for different
categories of lead plaintiffs, while Panel B compares these losses for
institutions with pre-PSLRA cases and all other post-PSLRA cases. Panel A
demonstrates that institutional lead plaintiffs appear in the cases with the
largest estimated provable losses: Both the means and medians for the two
institutional groups are statistically greater than for the other groups at all
147. See Cox & Thomas, SEC Heuristics, supra note 8, at 768 n.100.
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conventional levels.
Casual scrutiny of the remaining categories shows that cases brought by
entity lead plaintiffs seem to be the largest, while single individuals bring the
smallest cases on average. Pre-PSLRA cases have the lowest median provable
loss. Panel B reinforces this message.
These descriptive statistics demonstrate that institutional lead plaintiffs
bring the largest cases in the sample in terms of provable losses of the class.
Moreover, our data shows that there are no significant differences between
average provable losses in cases filed pre-PSLRA and those filed by the
remaining categories of lead plaintiffs. The medians, however, are statistically
different at the 5% level.
Our final set of descriptive statistics is in Table 8, which compares the
ratio of settlement amounts to provable losses. In essence, this table reports
the percentage of the estimated losses suffered by the class members that was
recouped through the settlement.
Table 8: Ratio of Settlement Amount to Provable Losses (%)

Plaintiff Type

Mean

Median

# of observations

Pre-PSLRA

13.5%

9.6%

128

Post-PSLRA

12.3%

5.1%

260

(1) Institution

5.8%

4.1%

34

(2) Group of Individuals

14.2%

5.7%

106

(3) Institution-Individuals

6.1%

3.3%

12

(4) Single Individual

17.0%

5.6%

50

(5) Entity

9.8%

4.7%

58

Total

12.7%

6.1%

388

Institutional Lead Plaintiffs: Categories 1 & 3

5.8%

4.1%

46

All Other Lead Plaintiffs Post-PSLRA

13.7%

5.3%

214

Surprisingly, pre-PSLRA cases show the highest median settlement
percentage of provable loss ratio, although the post-PSLRA single individual
lead plaintiff category exhibits the highest average percentage recovery. By
contrast, institutional lead plaintiffs have the lowest average and median
recovery percentages of any group. This would seem to indicate that
institutional investors are doing a worse job of recovering the losses of class
members. The regression analysis in Part II.C.2.d below provides a more
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positive explanation of the institution’s contribution.
To briefly summarize the descriptive statistics, the most important finding
is that institutional investors file the biggest cases, while the pre- and postPSLRA data seems very similar for the lead plaintiffs falling within Categories
2, 4, and 5. Given the relatively small number of institutional investor cases
that are filed, it does not appear that the passage of PSLRA has resulted in
much change in securities fraud class action awards. In the next section, we
dig deeper into the data to test these univariate findings.
2. Hypothesis Testing. — In this section, we use multivariate regression
analysis to better understand the interrelationships between the variables. We
focus on four questions: (1) Has PSLRA increased settlement amounts; (2)
what factors do institutional lead plaintiffs consider most important in deciding
to become lead plaintiffs; (3) does the presence of an institutional lead plaintiff
increase settlement sizes; and (4) which type of lead plaintiff among the three
noninstitutional lead plaintiff categories performs best? We note that in all of
the following regressions we use a logarithmic transformation of all the
variables measured in dollars. This technique mitigates the effect of some
large outliers in the data.
a. Impact of Lead Plaintiff Provision on Settlement Amounts. — One
important policy question is whether settlements in the post-PSLRA period are
larger than those in the pre-PSLRA era. Supporters of the PSLRA claimed that
its multiple provisions would reduce the incidence of strike suits and that more
meritorious suits would be successfully prosecuted in the less lawyer-driven
environment. That is, cases filed after the passage of PSLRA can proceed only
by satisfying a demanding pleading requirement and an opportunity for the suit
to be superintended by a class member with a substantial financial stake in the
suit’s outcome.148 Hence, the supporters reasoned that there would be fewer
cheap settlements of strong claims and fewer frivolous suits filed.149 If true,
this should increase settlement values post-PSLRA.
Table 9 presents the results for our regression analysis of the determinants
of settlements. The dependent variable is settlement amounts with independent
variables for estimated provable losses, market capitalization, length of class
period, and two dummy variables. “Dummy-SEC” is a dummy variable that
takes on a value of 1 if there is a parallel SEC action and a value of 0 if there is
not. It can be thought of as a proxy for quality of a case, as the SEC is more
likely to file an enforcement action against companies experiencing fraud.
“Dummy-PSLRA” has a value equal to 1 for post-PSLRA cases and a value of
0 for pre-PSLRA cases.

148. See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text.
149. Of course, there may be other reasons for fewer frivolous cases being filed after the
Act’s passage, including the possibility of court-ordered sanctions for frivolous cases and the
increased use of motions to dismiss.
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Table 9: Determinants of Log (Settlement Amounts)
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

Log (Provable Losses)

0.33

0.043

7.66

0.000

Log (Market Capitalization)

0.13

0.033

3.89

0.000

Class Period

0.02

0.007

2.45

0.015

Dummy-SEC

0.40

0.125

3.16

0.002

Dummy-PSLRA

-0.13

0.106

-1.25

0.213

Intercept

4.11

0.376

10.94

0.000

R-squared

0.50

Adjusted R-squared

0.49

Table 9 reports one of the most significant findings of our study. Once
we control for estimated losses, market capitalization of the defendant firms,
the length of the class period, and the presence of a parallel SEC action, postPSLRA settlements are not statistically different from those in the pre-PSLRA
period. These results suggest that the enactment of PSLRA had no significant
impact on settlement size.150 This finding raises the question whether PSLRA
and all of its procedural and substantive bells and whistles have been worth the
candle.
b. Determinants of Institutional Lead Plaintiff’s Decision to Come
Forward. — We next try to explain the determinants of institutional investors’
decisions to become lead plaintiffs. As we discussed earlier,151 relatively few
institutional investors have chosen to become lead plaintiffs, and they have
been very selective in their interventions. Our conversations with these
institutions and their attorneys lead us to believe that the decision criteria focus
primarily on the likelihood that the institution will be able to increase
substantially its recovery over what it would otherwise expect. Thus, we
would anticipate that institutional investors likely “cherry pick” cases,
selecting those where there are substantial potential damages and a high
probability of corporate malfeasance. Table 10 presents our regression results.
The dependent dummy variable measures the presence of an institutional lead
plaintiff, taking a value of 1 when an institution is lead plaintiff and 0

150. To test the robustness of this finding, we broke our sample into several subsamples
with low, middle, and high settlement amounts and ran the regression for each of them separately.
In each case, the coefficient on the PSLRA dummy remains insignificant.
151. See supra Part I.C.
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otherwise.152
Table 10: Determinants of Institutional Investors’ Decisions to Be Lead
Plaintiff (Logit Regression Analysis, post-PSLRA cases)153
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

Log (Provable Losses)

0.32

0.155

2.10

0.036

Log (Total Assets)

0.40

0.141

2.85

0.004

Class Period

0.03

0.019

1.45

0.148

Dummy-SEC

1.23

0.404

3.05

0.002

Intercept

-8.44

1.662

-5.08

0.000

McFadden R-squared
0.26
The regression shows that provable losses, total assets, and SEC actions
are statistically significant variables. In other words, an institutional investor is
more likely to become a lead plaintiff for cases against large capitalization

152. Logit regression allows us to handle binary dependant variables and to evaluate the
effect of a change in predictive variables on an event probability. In our case, such an event is the
decision of an institutional investor to become a lead plaintiff. Since logit is a nonlinear
regression, its coefficients do not have a simple interpretation. Specifically, consider the
population logit model with multiple regressors:
Pr(Y=1 | X1, X2 . . . Xn) = F(b0 + b1·X1 + . . . bn·Xn)
The effect of a change in, for example, the first regressor can be understood by calculating the
difference in predicted probabilities:
Pr(Y=1 | X1*+dX1, X2* . . . Xn*) - Pr(Y=1 | X1*, X2* . . . Xn*),
which, given the previous equation, equals to:
F(b0 + b1·[X1*+dX1] + . . . bn·Xn*) - F(b0 + b1·X1* + . . . bn·Xn*)
Notice that one must decide on the initial value of the regressor whose effect is of interest, as well
as all other regressors. One solution is to fix the regressors at their sample means or other
appropriate levels (here, fixed values are denoted with a “*”). The quantitative effect, of course,
will critically depend on the prespecified levels of regressors. The qualitative effect, on the other
hand, is easy to assess since F is the cumulative distribution function. For example, a positive
sign on the estimated coefficient of the provable loss variable suggests that, all else equal, cases
with high aggregate damages are more attractive to institutional investors. Thus, higher levels of
provable losses increase the probability that institutions come forward as lead plaintiffs.
153. We use total assets instead of market capitalization because there is a high degree of
multicollinearity between the estimated aggregate damages and the size of the defendant
company (the correlation between provable losses and market capitalization is about 80%). Total
assets is another credible measure of the size of the defendant company, and it has the advantage
of avoiding the multicollinearity problem because it has a smaller correlation (about 65%) with
provable losses.
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firms, with bigger estimated losses, and when the SEC has filed a parallel
action. The decision to become a lead plaintiff seems not to be affected by the
amount of estimated provable losses.
c. Impact of Institutional Lead Plaintiff on Settlements. — We next
analyze whether the presence of an institutional lead plaintiff leads to a greater
recovery. A popular thesis is that institutional investors are better monitors
than individuals, or groups of individuals, because they have larger financial
interests in the settlement and do not suffer from the collective action problems
experienced by groups of individuals trying to act as monitors.154
We have already seen in Table 4 that institutional investor lead plaintiffs
are associated with larger settlements, but is their presence the reason for the
larger recovery? In order to sort out whether it is the institutional lead plaintiff
or some other factor that results in bigger settlements, we include independent
variables for the market capitalization of the defendant company, the strength
of the claim, the size of the estimated damages, and the presence of a parallel
SEC action. The variable “Provable Losses * Dummy-Institution” equals the
amount of estimated provable losses in the settlement if the lead plaintiff is an
institutional lead plaintiff and 0 otherwise.155 We use this term to test whether
the elasticity of the amount of settlement with respect to provable losses goes
up (i.e., the percentage rate at which a typical settlement increases relative to a
1% increase in provable losses) when there is an institutional lead plaintiff.156
In other words, a positive value on this coefficient indicates that the relative
recovery is higher if there is an institutional lead plaintiff.157 Table 11 gives
the results of our regressions.
Table 11: Determinants of Log (Settlement Amount), post-PSLRA cases
154. See supra Part I.D.2.
155. This variable is the cross-product of the amount of provable losses and a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 if an institution is among a lead plaintiff group and 0 otherwise. The
interpretation of the results is the following: If we consider two cases that differ in the type of
lead plaintiff but have the same market capitalization, class period, and the presence of an SEC
action, then the elasticity of the dollar amount recovered in the class action with respect to the
amount of provable losses increases by 0.04 in the case of an institutional lead plaintiff. That is,
for the case without an institutional lead plaintiff, the elasticity of the settlement is equal to 0.26,
while for the case with an institutional lead plaintiff it goes up to 0.3 (0.26 + 0.04), with the
increase being economically and statistically significant.
We note that this variable does not exhibit a high degree of multicollinearity with the
provable loss variable, with the correlation coefficient equal to 0.42.
156. One possible objection to this equation is that there might be an endogeneity problem
because of uncertainty whether the presence of an institutional lead plaintiff caused a higher
settlement or whether the presence of a higher potential settlement attracted an institutional lead
plaintiff. We considered this problem, but determined it was not an issue. By the time the
settlement agreement is reached, the identity of the lead plaintiff is already determined, which
eliminates any potential endogeneity.
157. We had no prior hypothesis about what the correct specification for this variable should
be and therefore tried several specifications, including a linear specification. The reported form
of equation gave the best fit to the data.
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Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

Log (Provable Losses)

0.26

0.055

4.85

0.000

Log (Market Capitalization)

0.13

0.039

3.25

0.001

Class Period

0.02

0.008

1.96

0.052

Dummy-SEC

0.33

0.161

2.02

0.045

Log (Provable Losses) * Dummy-Institution

0.04

0.017

2.07

0.040

Intercept

4.70

0.526

8.95

0.000

R-squared

0.47

Adjusted R-squared

0.45

The increased recoveries observed when an institution serves as the lead
plaintiffs are economically and statistically significant. For each 1% increase
in provable losses, the settlement amount increases 0.26%. If there is an
institution as lead plaintiff, the settlement amount increases an additional
0.04%.158 Institutional lead plaintiffs, therefore, increase settlement size, all
other things being held constant.159 Most of the independent variables in this
equation are statistically significant at the 5% level, with only class period
slightly less significant, at the 5.2% level.
d. Impact of Other Types of Lead Plaintiffs. — Having found that
institutional lead plaintiffs positively increase settlements, we next ask the
same question about a single individual (“individuals”), an aggregation of
individuals (“aggregations”), and a group that includes a noninstitutional entity
(“entities”).160 Is any one of these three superior to the other two?

158. In other words, holding all other regressors fixed, a 1% increase in provable losses
yields a 0.26% increase in the amount of settlement plus an additional 0.04% increase if the lead
plaintiff is an institution. The dollar amount of this effect obviously depends on starting (or
benchmark) levels of variables. For example, let us, for expositional simplicity, assume that the
sample median of settlement amount ($5.7 million) corresponds to the median amount of
provable losses ($91 million). Then, if the amount of estimated aggregate losses increases by
$9.1 million, the amount of settlement is expected to increase by $148,000 and $171,000 in the
case of noninstitutional and institutional lead plaintiffs, respectively.
We note that these results appear inconsistent with the findings of Professor Alexander that
settlement size is invariant to the merits of a case in securities class action litigation. See Janet
Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43
Stan. L. Rev. 497, 499–500 (1991).
159. Of course, we cannot control for all other factors, only the ones on which we have data.
There may be other indicators of quality that we are not capturing. If so, it could still be true that
higher recoveries remain a function of these other better qualities of the cases selected by
institutions.
160. For a subsample of 162 cases for which we had data, we calculated the percentage of
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We saw earlier that the three groups, post-PSLRA, are not statistically
different across mean and median length of the class period, market
capitalization of defendant companies, time to reach settlement, and the ratio
of settlement amount to provable losses. However, the median settlement
amounts are statistically different at the 1% level. The median settlement
amount for the entities, at $6.5 million, is nearly double that for individuals
($3.3 million) and one-third larger than that for aggregations ($4.4 million).
The relative settlement amounts across these three types of lead plaintiffs
mirror in some respect their differences in provable losses: The median
provable loss for entities ($148.5 million) is nearly double the median provable
loss for settlements with individuals ($76 million) and 38% greater than when
the lead plaintiff is an aggregation ($91.8 million).161 Thus, as among the
three types of noninstitutional lead plaintiffs, it appears that entities bring cases
against larger companies that have larger market capitalization, significantly
greater provable losses, and larger settlement amounts.
To examine more fully our data regarding the three types of
noninstitutional lead plaintiffs, we divide the post-PSLRA settlements for each
type of lead plaintiff into three groups based on the market capitalization of the
defendant (i.e., highest third, middle third, and lowest third of market
capitalization). After doing so, we observe that for the individuals, the size in
dollars of the settlements reached against the lowest-tier market capitalization
defendants are bigger than those reached against the top-tier market
capitalization defendants. The other two types of lead plaintiffs exhibit the
opposite pattern, with settlement amounts increasing with the defendant firms’
market capitalization.162 On the other hand, the provable loss ratio declines
significantly across all three types of lead plaintiffs as market capitalization
and provable losses increase. However, individuals perform better than the
other two types of lead plaintiffs in the bottom-tier cases. The converse is true
in the top-tier cases. In short, it appears that individuals perform best in the
small cases and perform worst in the big cases.
To further examine the relative strengths of these three types of lead
plaintiffs, we performed a regression analysis similar to the one in Table 9.
Specifically, we regressed the logarithm of the settlement amount on the
logarithms of provable losses and market capitalization as well as on the length

settlements reached by the largest plaintiffs’ law firm by type of lead plaintiff. We found that the
largest firm filed 87% of the cases brought by individual lead plaintiffs, 32% of the institutional
lead plaintiff cases, and roughly 65% of the remaining cases. These differences were not
statistically significant, although we did find that the presence of this particular law firm did
result in faster settlements without a significant loss in settlement value.
161. Although these medians’ differences are statistically significant at the 20% level, this is
outside generally accepted standards of significance.
162. We performed the same analysis with provable losses. We found modest increases in
settlement amount for individuals between the bottom and top market capitalization tiers based on
relative provable losses, but dramatically larger increases for the other two types of plaintiffs:
Increases were nearly triple for entities and quadruple for aggregations.
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of class period and a dummy variable that controls for a parallel SEC action.
In addition, we included two cross-product terms that would allow us to test
how individuals’ performance in terms of relative recovery differs from the
performance of other lead plaintiff types. The results are shown in Table
12.163 The residual category in this specification includes the pre-PSLRA
cases, and therefore all coefficients measure the effect of the variable in
comparison to the pre-PSLRA levels.
Table 12: Effect of Individual Lead Plaintiff on Log (Settlement Amount)164
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

Log (Provable Losses)

0.25

0.059

4.14

0.000

Log (Provable Losses) * Single Lead Plaintiff

-0.09

0.118

-0.78

0.438

Log (Market Capitalization)

0.21

0.039

5.40

0.000

Log (Market Capitalization) * Single Lead Plaintiff

-0.08

0.033

-2.34

0.020

Class Period

0.02

0.007

2.82

0.006

Dummy-SEC

0.18

0.167

1.10

0.274

Intercept

7.44

0.211

35.29

0.000

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared

0.33
0.31

These results are consistent with the discussion above. In particular, the
variable “Log (Market Capitalization) * Single Lead Plaintiff” is negative and
significant, showing that the elasticity of the amount of settlement with respect
to market capitalization deteriorates significantly if a single individual acts as a

163. This regression is calculated for the subsample of cases involving individuals, groups
of individuals, and other entities only. We do not include cases involving institutional investors.
164. As mentioned earlier, see supra note 153, the amount of provable losses is highly
correlated with the size of the defendant company. Given that market capitalization and provable
losses are highly correlated, including both in the regression will lead to estimates that may not
correctly reflect an individual effect of each variable. To circumvent this problem, we first
regress provable losses onto market capitalization; the residual from this regression,
consequently, is orthogonal to the size of the defendant company. We then use this residual in the
regression specification presented in Table 12—this technique allows us to track the effect of
provable losses on the amount of settlement beyond that contained in the market capitalization
variable and to separate and analyze the effect of provable losses. While this procedure affects
point estimates of regression coefficients, it does not affect the overall fit of the regression.
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lead plaintiff as opposed to a group of individuals or an entity.165 Thus for
each 1% increase in market capitalization, the settlement amount increases by
0.21%. If the lead plaintiff is an individual, the increase is only 0.13%. The
same result appears in the relative recovery per additional percent of provable
losses. This decline, however, is not statistically significant. In short,
individual lead plaintiffs do best in increasing settlements in small cases, while
the two groups do better for the larger ones.166
e. Explaining the Decline in Provable Loss Ratios. — As we noted in our
discussion of Table 8, our univariate analysis shows that provable loss ratios
(that is, the ratio of settlement amounts to estimated provable losses)
apparently declined in the post-PSLRA period. To unpack this result, we use a
multivariate regression of the determinants of these ratios and present the
results in Table 13.
Table 13: Determinants of Provable Loss Ratio
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

Log (Market Capitalization)

-1.20

0.315

-3.80

0.000

Class Period

-0.20

0.087

-2.30

0.022

Dummy-SEC167

-0.11

1.640

-0.07

0.945

Dummy-Institution

-5.69

1.994

-2.85

0.005

Dummy-Group of Individuals

-2.76

2.087

-1.32

0.187

Dummy-Institution and Individuals

-5.67

2.497

-2.27

0.024

Dummy-Single Individual

-6.11

2.256

-2.71

0.007

Dummy-Entity

-2.23

2.734

-0.81

0.416

Intercept

21.87

2.607

8.39

0.000

165. The intuition behind this result is identical to that explained at supra note 155.
166. The regression reported in Table 12 is specified in logs. As such, it allows us to
analyze the impact of the lead plaintiff type on the relative recovery in settlements, not the
absolute dollar amount.
167. This variable refers to the presence of an SEC enforcement action involving the same
misrepresentation that is the subject of the class action settlement. In a separate study, we
examined the effects on settlements when there is a parallel SEC enforcement action vis-à-vis
when there is not. See Cox & Thomas, SEC Heuristics, supra note 8, at 767–74 (concluding that
private suits with parallel SEC enforcement actions settle sooner and finding some evidence that
such suits also recover higher percentages of provable losses, particularly in very low percentage
recovery cases).
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Table 13 shows that provable loss ratios have significantly declined in the
post-PSLRA period from their pre-PSLRA level for both categories of
institutional investors and the individuals.168 These results are robust to
different specifications of the regression equation, although the explanatory
power of the equation is quite low.169
Institutional investors bring cases in which the estimated provable losses
are very high, and the amount of settlement dollars, although greater on
average than in the pre-PSLRA period,170 nonetheless did not increase as
rapidly as did provable losses.171 One possible reason for the relatively slower
rate of growth of settlement amounts relative to provable losses might be that
the amount of the defendants’ insurance policies have not kept pace with the
firm’s exposure as captured by the provable losses in individual cases.172 One
practitioner commenting on these results suggested that $100 million is the top
end of the insurance coverage for these cases.173 If PSLRA has increased

168. We were also concerned that the relatively short period of time between the end of our
sample and our analysis might bias our results in favor of finding that post-PSLRA cases had
lower provable loss ratios. In results not shown, we tested to see if the length of time to
settlement had an effect on the results shown in Table 11, panel B. We found this term to be
insignificant when included in the regression analysis. We also found that the length of the
settlement period is only weakly correlated with the settlement amount and estimated provable
losses. We conclude that the shorter time to settlement is not a significant determinant of the
differences between our pre-PSLRA and post-PSLRA provable loss ratios.
169. In addition to the results shown, we used specifications that included replacing market
capitalization with other proxies for firm size such as the amount of total assets, combining
dummy variables into coarser groups, and excluding variables that did not seem to affect
significantly the dependent variable.
170. See supra Table 4.
171. Our results are consistent with those found by Buckberg et al. in their recent survey of
trends in the shareholder class action area. See Buckberg et al., WorldCom and Enron, supra note
23, at 6 (showing decline in median ratio of settlement to investor losses from 6.1% in 1995 to
2.5% in 2005).
172. We strongly suspect that an important variable in the settlement process is the amount
of insurance available. We did not examine this variable for several reasons. First, it would be
quite burdensome (and in many cases fruitless) to try to obtain this information. The amount of
insurance coverage is not disclosed in SEC filings; hence, this information would have to be
obtained from the documents obtained by plaintiff’s counsel through discovery. Second, and
more importantly, the standard insurance policy is akin to a wasting asset in the sense that
litigation expenses (most importantly attorneys’ fees for the company as well as covered officers
and directors) are paid periodically throughout the life of the suit. Thus, what is relevant is not
the initial amount of available insurance but the coverage that has not been depleted when the
hour of settlement approaches. Discovering this figure in each of our cases would be truly a
Herculean if not imponderable undertaking.
173. These comments were made by Geoffrey C. Jarvis, a director of Grant & Eisenhofer,
P.A., during a conference held at Fordham Law School. Both authors attended this conference,
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defense costs on average by prolonging these cases, then that may also drain
the funds in the typical insurance policy.174
In cases involving individual lead plaintiffs, the interpretation is more
difficult. We know that on average these cases are the smallest ones in the
post-PSLRA period in terms of settlement amounts, market capitalization of
the defendant firms, and estimated provable losses. We speculate that since
these cases typically involve issuers with relatively small market
capitalizations, they attract fewer large institutional investors, who generally
eschew small issuers because of liquidity concerns. Thus, smaller investors are
more likely to become lead plaintiffs.
If these investors are the worst monitors of plaintiffs’ counsel, and
therefore the least likely to reduce litigation agency costs, settlements in these
cases may recover lower levels of provable losses compared to the pre-PSLRA
cases when we adjust for the effect of market capitalization and the length of
the class period. This could explain the apparent disparity between the
univariate results shown in Table 8 and the multiple regression results
appearing in Table 13.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
We find that institutional lead plaintiffs add value for shareholders,
although perhaps not as much as was expected by the architects of PSLRA’s
lead plaintiff provision. Our data shows that institutions increase settlements
by 0.04% for every 1% increase in provable losses. Although this is small, it is
statistically significant among the variables we examined. Institutional lead
plaintiffs appear in cases involving larger provable losses and generate better
recoveries in those cases, but they appear in very few cases, at least during the
period of our data set. Moreover, given the difficulty of controlling for all
aspects of quality, it is also possible that the higher settlements in these cases
may reflect that institutions take the better cases.
Our real concern about institutions is that they do not seem to be able to
increase dollar recoveries at the same pace as provable losses. This is
disappointing and facially inconsistent with institutional lead plaintiffs’ beliefs
that they can double or triple recoveries overall.175 We also need to assess
which was held on November 4, 2005.
174. PSLRA has led to longer times before cases reach settlement than under the old
system. See Elaine Buckberg et al., NERA Econ. Consulting, Recent Trends in Securities Class
Action Litigation: Will Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley Change the Tides? 5 (2003) (“Prior to
PSLRA, 61% of cases were disposed in three years and 77% in five years; since, only 44% have
been disposed in three years and 62% in five years.”). If this increases litigation costs for the
parties, then less money is left in the policy for paying class members because most directors’ and
officers’ insurance policies deduct defense costs out of the amount of the policy’s coverage.
Plaintiffs’ counsel will also incur greater costs from any increased litigation, and these may
increase the amount of any attorneys’ fees award that they obtain in a settlement.
175. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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how institutional shareholders will impact settlements if they appear in a
broader set of cases. Our data reflects that institutions do increase settlements
relative to other types of lead plaintiffs, although the increase, while
statistically significant, is small. We therefore question whether institutions’
sole goal is to maximize settlement amounts. Instead, we believe they might
see their role as balancing settlements against the long-term interests of the
defendant company whose shares the institution may continue to own. In that
scenario, institutions can be expected to trade off higher recoveries against the
company’s treasury for small recoveries against the insurer and officers
responsible for the fund as well as prospective reforms of the company’s
corporate governance structure.
More generally, we were surprised to find that provable loss ratios have
declined in the post-PSLRA period. While we must be cautious not to
overinterpret this result, its potential significance is enormous: Investors
appear to be recovering a smaller percentage of their losses today than they did
before the passage of the Act.176 We speculate about some explanations for
this phenomenon, such as a relatively slow rate of growth of insurance
policies, but this remains an important area for more research.
On a policy level, we continue to support the overall value of financial
institutions serving as lead plaintiffs. Our major recommendations focus on
nurturing greater participation in securities class actions by institutional lead
plaintiffs. Steps in this direction would not only be consistent with our data
but also with the legislative history of the PSLRA, which is richly laden with
expectations that class action suits would be greatly improved by attracting
institutions to become the suits’ plaintiffs.177
In particular, we believe courts should be more willing, indeed activist, in
awarding costs to institutional lead plaintiffs for all expenses related to an
institution’s participation as a lead plaintiff. Such awards should compensate
the institution not only for direct costs of participation, such as travel or
deposition time related to the suit’s prosecution, but should also include
reasonable reimbursement for indirect costs such as those recounted earlier.178
Indeed, we believe any award of costs should be some multiple of the actual
amount attributed to the damages.179
The appropriate analogy is to the “lodestar” method for determining fee
awards in class action suits.180 Just as the class counsel is rewarded for such

176. As noted earlier, this result is confirmed in Buckberg et al., WorldCom and Enron,
supra note 23, at 6 (showing decline in median ratio of settlement to investor losses from 6.1% in
1995 to 2.5% in 2005).
177. See supra note 27–31 and accompanying text.
178. See supra Part I.C.3.
179. The professional plaintiffs limitation in PSLRA, discussed further at infra note 181,
could be used to police any aberrant behavior, such as taking lots of cases to make money on the
reimbursement multiple.
180. The lodestar method of calculating attorney fee awards in class actions takes the
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factors as the uncertainty of the suit, the skill and experience devoted to the
suit’s prosecution, and the ultimate outcome, we believe similar considerations
should justify awarding to the institutional lead plaintiff an award greater than
the costs directly attributable to the suit. We hope this would encourage more
institutions to adopt socially desirable internal and external procedures to
evaluate their decision to become a lead plaintiff.
Furthermore, we believe courts generally should follow the lead of the
few judges that have been willing, in the right circumstances, to excuse the
“professional plaintiff” restrictions of the PSLRA.181 Simply stated, a
demonstrated record as a diligent monitor of the present suit, when coupled
with a good track record of being such a monitor in other cases, should be
more than enough to persuade the court that the petitioning institution has only
the positive characteristics associated with being a professional plaintiff. We
number of hours worked by class counsel and multiplies them by a reasonable hourly rate with
some adjustments for factors like the uncertainty of the suit and the skill and experience of
counsel. This method has been criticized by some scholars as creating financial incentives for
class counsel to prolong the litigation and for giving these attorneys little incentive to try to
maximize the class recovery. See John Bronsteen, Class Action Settlements: An Opt-In
Proposal, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 903, 911 n.54 (arguing that lodestar method “results in collusion
[with defendants] even more than does the contingent fee”); Charles Silver, Due Process and the
Lodestar Method: You Can’t Get There from Here, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 1809, 1817–20 (2000)
(noting several ways in which contingency fee arrangements are superior).
181. The PSLRA added § 21D(a)(3)(B)(vi) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 101(b), §
21D(a)(3)(B)(vi), 109 Stat. 737, 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi) (2000)), which
bars one from serving as a lead plaintiff if during the preceding three-year period the person has
been a lead plaintiff in more than five securities class actions, unless the court otherwise approves
that such a plaintiff being a representative is “consistent with the purposes of” the lead plaintiff
provision. Id. Most courts recognize that the professional plaintiff bar is less applicable or even
inapplicable to institutional investors. See Smith v. Suprema Specialties, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 2d
627, 640–41 (D.N.J. 2002) (collecting cases). Our approach is less sweeping and generally
follows the results reached in a series of cases initiated by the Florida State Board of
Administration (FSBA), which is a frequent lead plaintiff in securities suits. Courts have invoked
the bar against FSBA when another party whose losses are greater is petitioning to become the
lead plaintiff, see In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67 F. Supp. 2d 803, 818–24 (N.D. Ohio 1999)
(choosing as plaintiff group two plaintiffs whose losses were twice those of FSBA during relevant
class period), or when an institution whose losses are less than that of FSBA is petitioning to be
the lead plaintiff. See In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 206 F.R.D. 427, 456–57 (S.D. Tex. 2002)
(justifying in part selection of another institution whose losses were 40% those of FSBA because
FSBA was actively involved in four ongoing suits); Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 79 F.
Supp. 2d 1146, 1156–57 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (justifying in part disqualification of FSBA because of
presence of other institutional investors seeking to serve as lead plaintiff). FSBA has been
excused from the professional plaintiff bar when it is the only institution petitioning to be a lead
plaintiff. See In re DaimlerChrysler AG Sec. Litig., 216 F.R.D. 291, 299 (D. Del. 2003)
(explaining selection of FSBA as lead plaintiff based on its attention to suit despite its status as
lead plaintiff in eight other suits); Naiditch v. Applied Micro Circuits Corp., No. 01-CV-0649,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21374, at *2–*3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2001) (selecting FSBA with losses of
$5.3 million over two individuals with losses of $980,000); In re Critical Path, Inc. Sec. Litig, 156
F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (preferring FSBA to other flawed institutional investors
despite FSBA’s status as lead plaintiff in six ongoing suits).
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believe this exception is more easily made when the institution has internal
safeguards, such as those required by a few states, which insulate the decision
to become a lead plaintiff from “pay-to-play” influences.182 More generally,
all institutions considering becoming a lead plaintiff should adopt procedures
to insulate their internal processes from the harmful effects of political
contributions by class action law firms.
If we consider the remaining types of lead plaintiffs, our data supports the
view that groups perform better than individuals as lead plaintiffs in larger
cases, while groups that include an entity yield larger settlements and greater
provable loss ratios than those that occur with mere aggregation of individuals.
These are among the most surprising findings of our study because most
commentators (ourselves included) have cast a skeptical eye toward
aggregation as a means of finding the most adequate plaintiff. However, our
earlier supposition that a group would perform worse than an individual is not
borne out by our settlement size and provable loss data.
We suspect that any group’s strength as a monitor is correlated positively
to the biggest group member’s financial stake in the suit. We have not tested
this hypothesis because we lack data on which to conduct such a test, but our
small sample of cases in Table 2, showing stock ownership of lead plaintiffs, is
suggestive in this regard. Nevertheless, we believe that, when a court is
considering two competing groups of individuals, the relative inquiry should
not be which group has the largest financial loss but rather the relative size of
the financial loss suffered by the biggest owner in each group. In other words,
courts should look most critically at the size of the largest group member’s
stake in deciding between otherwise similar groups.
Single individual plaintiffs perform best in the smallest cases. This is
encouraging because no institutions apply to be appointed lead plaintiff in
these cases. Smaller capitalization firms with their concomitant smaller
provable losses mean that the costs of being a lead plaintiff in such a suit dwarf
the likely benefits from doing so. Moreover, most financial institutions do not
hold shares in very small market capitalization defendants because of their
illiquid nature. Hence, suits against such defendant companies are likely to
remain the domain of individual investors or groups of individual investors.
Conversely, in bigger cases with larger provable losses, single individual
lead plaintiffs do worse than institutional plaintiffs. We suspect this is due to
inattention by the lead plaintiff and the eagerness of the suit’s class counsel to
reap the proffered settlement rather than to push for a larger settlement. It is in
this domain that the securities class action remains lawyer driven and that the
ill effects that the lead plaintiff provision was designed to address continue to
abound. Groups seem to be preferable in these situations.
Finally, we wish to reiterate our concerns about the possible “pay-to-play”

182. See supra Part I.D.1.
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practices that are alleged to be emerging in this area.183 We think that this
type of allegation, if widely substantiated, could undermine the legitimacy and
utility of the lead plaintiff provision. The simplest, and perhaps most effective,
solution would be for courts to require plaintiffs’ law firms that are candidates
for the lead counsel position to disclose any campaign contributions or other
payments they have made to prospective class representatives, their managers,
directors, or other control persons, before the court appoints a lead plaintiff for
the class. Hopefully, this disclosure would put to rest ugly rumors and also
serve as a good disinfectant.

183. See supra Part I.D.1.

